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HEALTH CARE'S ''THIRTY YEARS WAR'':
THE ORIGINS AND DISSOLUTION
OF MANAGED CARE
THOMAS R. MCIEAN* & EDWARD P. RICHARDS**

INTRODUCTION
In 1618, Reformation and the Catholic Church's Counter-Ref
ormation engulfed Europe in a complex war that lasted until the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In a similar manner, the passage of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)

1

in 1974,

and the ensuing growth of managed care, have engulfed health
care in a holy war between insu rers, physicians, and patients over
the control of medical decisionmaking. This fight is driven by the
increasing cost of health care, both in absolute terms and as a per
centage of the Gross National Product (GNP). Private and govern
mental health care insurers, who pay for almost all health care in
the United States, argue that traditional fee-for-service medicine
created i n centives that increase cost and lead to substandard medi
cal care through over-treatment and inappropriate treatment.
Many patients and health care p roviders counter that insurers want
to cut costs without regard to quality of care. The battleground is
state legislatures and state courts, where opponents of managed
care initiate tort lawsuits and draft state insurance regulations.
Initially, courts ruled that ERISA's preemption clause2 prevents
states from regulating ERISA-qualified plans, either directly or indi
rectly through tort litigation.
*

These rulings gave ERISA managed
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l. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1 974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§§

1001-1461 (2000)).

2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

� ll44(a)

§

514(a), 29 U.S.C.

(stating that ERISA provisions "shall supersede any and all State laws

msofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," barring
certain exemptions).
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care plans a significant economic edge in the market: ERISA p lans
could co ntro l p hysician decisionmaking w ith impunity, while non

ERISA plans faced state benefit mandates and mountir_ ig medi�al
malpractice litigation.3 A5 ERISA plans became the domina n t deliv
erers of health care, however, managed care horror stories began to
appear on the nightly news and in t he courts. Over time, t ese

�

horror stories caused the courts to re-examine ERISA p r e emp t ion

,

culminating in a s eries of United States Supreme Court cases be
tween 2000 and

2003 that have dramatically changed the leg al land

scape for managed care. This article reviews the rise and fall of
ERISA preemption and its impact on managed care, and considers
how this developing issue will affect health care in the United
States

.

Part I of this a r ticle reviews the p re-ERISA landscape of medi
cal care delivery and how it was shaped by the issues associated with
traditional health insurance.

This section further explains how

medical inflation arises both from a very real expansion of medical
needs and from medical imperialism-the failure of the medical

care paradigm in the United States. Part II of this article examines
the rise of ERISA p r otected Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)4
-

and their effects on medical care de liv e ry

.

Part III of this a rticle

analyzes the Supreme Court's retrenchment on ERISA pre emp tion,

beg innin g with Pegram v. Herdrich5 and culminating with Kentucky
Ass'n of Health Plans v. MiUer.6 While Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans
may not be the health care Treaty of Westphalia, it will have
profound effects on health care insurance. Finally, Part IV of this

�rt ic le iscusses how the erosion of ERISA protec tions and the ever
mcreasmg cost of health care will d r ive market consolidation in
hea t insur�n ce , 7 shifting health insure r management of medical
deos1onmakmg towards a system run in accordance with national

?

�?

3. SPP, P.g., Fox v. Health Net, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside Cty.,
(state court jury awarded $89,128,153 in damages, including pun i
t "·e damages, agams a plan that delayed the patient's receiving what was then
�
_
ums1dere
d an experimental treatment).
4.
h is is the u_mbrell� term for health insurance plans that impose controls
_
.
phvs1oan
deos1onma
kmg, either directly or through financial incentives.
_
Courts, mclu m ? the United States Supreme Court, tend to
use "health mainte
�i�·gan�zatton" HMO) as a generic term, but this is an incorrect usage .
11nphes a par�te ular type of organizat ional structure, usually with a captive
.
ph)s1c1an group provtdmg
care on a fixed cost basis.
5. 530 U.S. 211 (2000) .
fi . 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003) .
.
7. For addition al infrirmation, see Thomas R. McLean
& Edward P. Richards,
_ 1tw11:
l·./Wi:\ l'rP-b11/
High Court'.� Road Map, NA·1"L LJ, June 9, 2003,
at 39.

�ec. 23 . 1993)
o.n

'..iance
H��-0

�

?

�
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guidelines that define "medical necessity" and appropriate medical
procedure.H

\i\'e argue that this brave new world of standardized

medical care may improve care in some situations and can lower
costs while preserving or impnwing the quality of care.

On the

other hand, we argue that the construction and mass utilization of
clinical guidelines does not address the failure of the United States
to examine the underlying social welfare and environmental issues
that lead to poor health and increase the cost of medical care.
Moreover, we assert that guideline-driven protocols fail to address
universal access to care and the tragic choices implicit in a system
based on a paradigm that promises cures and miracles for aging
and death itselfY
I.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDICINE
The most important constant in medical care and the medical
care delivery system is change: medicine is not a stable industry,
and its deve lopment is shaped by e conomic and political factors as
much as by science. Medical insurance does not just pay for medi
cal care-it shapes the medical care delivery system, determines
what treatments are developed, and formulates our view of what
constitutes medical care. Medical care is a hybrid industry based on
applied technology and services.

The technology component is

global and subject to global market forces. Medical care in France,
Germany, and the United States is based on the same science, but
medical care in European countries is very different from care in
the United States. For instance, compared to the rest of the world,
the United States is much more likely to expend resources t o apply
high-tech solutions to commonplace

medical conditions,

even

when such expe nditures may not improve medical care in any sig
nificant fashion.1<>

The service

component of medicine in the

United States (its personal aspect) re mains very local a n d is shaped
8. For additional information, s e e Thomas R. McLean, The Implications of Pa
tient Safety Research & Risk Managed Care, 26 S. ILL U. LJ. 227 (2002) [hereinafter
Impl ications]; Thomas R. McLean, The Institute of Medicine and the Risk Managed Care
Revolution, GREATER KAN. CnY Mm. BULL. Apr., 2001, at 16-19.
9. See infra n o tes 52 54; see also Gumo CAl.ABREsr & PHILIP Boss1rr, TRAGIC
-

CHOICES

(197 8).

10. For example, consider coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery.
Appr oximately 600,000 CABG procedures are perlormed annually in the United
States, only two-thirds of which may have been medically appropriate.

David A.

Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for
Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1427, 1437, 1487 (2001). Per capita, the
United States perlorms far more CABGs than any other country in the world.
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by state and federal laws and norms. To understand how these two
components interact, it is necessary to conside� the development of
modem medicine from a historian's perspecttve.
A.

Pre-World War II

While modern medicine has some roots in the systematic ob
servations of the alchemist Paracelsus, 11 it is best dated to the work
of Ignaz Semmelweis, a French obstetrician who introduced c?n
trolled observations and statistical analysis with his studies of child
bed fever in the mid 1800s.12 While few of Semmelweis'
con temporaries took heed of his observation that physicians' dirty
hands spread disease, his work was fundamental to the later work of
Pasteur and Koch, who developed the germ theory of disease, and
Lister, who showed how to clean medical equipment and personnel
to prevent infection. Coupled with the discovery of anesthesia, the
germ theory transformed surgical practice from a mostly unsuccess
ful and extremely unpleasant process to a life-saving intervention.
In the late 1800s, for the first time in history, a patient's
chances of survival were improved by seeing a physician and going
to a hospital. This fueled both medical licensing movements and
the expansion of hospitals and medical practice.1'.'\

At the same

time, the sanitation movement in public health began to dramati
cally reduce the death rate associated with infectious diseases. In
aggregate, the innovations of the latter years of the nineteenth cen
tury led to a rapid increase in life expectancy and the beginnings of
a public expectation of life-long health rather than disease and
death.
In contrast, innovation and regulation came slowly to the non
surgical fields of medicine.14 Non-surgical medicine changed little
Hans G. Brost, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Thoracic Surgeons
Uan. 2000).
11. Early 16th Century alchemist and mystic. See William Osler, The Evolu.
ll�� of Modern Medicine, A Series of Lectures Delivered at Yale University on the
S1lhman Foundation in April, 1913, avai/,ab/,e al htt ://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Books/
p
osler/modern_medicine.htm (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American
Law) (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).

12. lcNAZ PHILIPP SEMMELWEIS, THE ETIOLOGY, CONCEPT, AND PROPHYLAXIS OF
C11IU>BE1> hwR (K. Codell Carter ed., trans., The Univ.
of Wisc. Press 1983).
13. PAUL STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA
N MEDICINE 156-57
(1982).
14'. F�r a more d etailed discussi n of health care and
the regulation of health
�
.
care.
pnm to_ 1930, �ee Edward P. Richards, The Police Powl?r and the
Regulation o
.
Mt>'.l_iral Pmrl1c�: A Histon�al Review and Guidefor Medical Licens ng Board e la ion of
R gu t
i
f
Phpwnns 111 /�RISA-Qualified Mana ed
g Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201,

t004]
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until the 1930s and 1940s, when the introduction of a ntibiotics al
lowed the successful treatment o f common infections such as pneu
monia and tuberculosis. As medicine became more e ffective, there
was more concern about providing access to medical care.

In the

1930s, medical insurance was introduced in two forms: the Kaiser
Permanente and Blue Cross plans.
When the Grand Coulee Dam was being built, construction was
hampered by a logistic problem: how to provide health care work
ers to care for the employees at t h e remote dam con s truction site?
George Kaiser introduced a model whereby his c ompany would
make arrangements with physicians to provide health care for a
fixed-maximal fee.1f> While many believe that capitated medical
care was not invented until Health Maintenance Organizations ap
peared in the late 1960s, the history of MCOs can actually be traced
to Kaiser's Grand Coulee Dam plan. However, because MCOs did
not reap the financial rewards of fee-for-service

(FFS) 16 medicine,

they were relegated to the sidelines of medical care until the 1970s.
The first Blue Cross plan was developed in Baylor, Texas. In
1929, Baylor University Hospital offered to provide hospital care for
up to twenty-one days for teachers who were willing to purchase
insurance coverage for six dollars a year.17 At first, the purpose of
this type of plan was not so much to provide health benefits as to
keep cash flowing into hospitals.18 Over time, though, Baylor's
plan for hospital insurance evolved into an indemnity insurance
sche me. The resulting Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance system 19
bec ame the quintessential FFS health insurance plan i n that it pro

vided first dollar coverage for all m e dical expenses that were "usual,
cust omary and reasonable."20

202 -20 (1999); Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physi
cian Exte nders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for Health Care Deliv

ery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 244-46 (2002) [hereinafter Quality Chasm].
1 5. See Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians In Managed Care:

A Multid imensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk,

Mrn. 443, 447 n.20 (1997).

18]. LEGAL

16. Also c alled indemnity insurance, this is t raditional health insurance that
pays for what the physician orders without trying to manage the physician's medi
cal decisionmaking.

17. GEORGE D. LUNDBERG & JAMES STACY, SEVERED TRUST: WHY AMERJCAN
MEDICINE HASN'T BEEN FIXED 24 (2000).
18. Id. at 25.
19. Ten years after the Blue Cross hospital insurance was introduced, Blue

Shield, a phys ician insurance scheme that was analogous to Blue Cross , was intro
duced. Id. at 82
.

20. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Columbia/HCA: Villain Or Victim?, HEALTH A.FF.,
Mar./ Apr. 1998, at 30, 31 (Medicare, set up in 1964, adop ted the same "usual,
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Blue Cross plans (which cover hospital services) a nd Blue
_
Shield plans (which cover physician services) were orgamzed ai:d
run by physicians and hospitals, so it i s not surprising that they paid

what providers charged. Indeed, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans be
came emblematic of FFS health insurance because they rewarded
physicians for providing medical services, and lacked mechanisms
whereby negative feedback could be used to inhibit the o ver-pre
scription of medical services. Accordingly, in a FFS incentive envi
ronment, physicians overutilize (i.e., over-prescribe) health care
treatment.21 Additionally, FFS lacks a mechanism to define "medi
cal necessity," as it relies on physicians to make all medical deci
sions.22 This was not a significant problem prior to 1960, when
efficacious medical treatment was largely limited to the prescription
of antibiotics and some straightforward surgical procedures, and
when physicians were limited in their capacity to over-treat patients.
During the 1960s, however, high technology found the medical
field, and physicians began to offer patients such expensive items as
and
bypass surgery,
c o r o nary artery
transplantation,2:-:1
chemotherapy.
B.

Post-World War II-Medical Imperialism and Medical Inflation

In the decades following World War II, medical care in the
United States, and its costs, have been shaped by three economic
factors: third-party payment for medical care, FFS reimbursement,
and the expansion of the nation's capacity to provide high-tech
customary, an d reasonable" standard developed by the private health insurance
plans.).

2 I. Nor was there any informal brake on our health care system. After the

�overnment determined that health insurance was an "ordinary and n ecessary"
business exp�nse, health care was increasingly provided by business as an em

plmt'l' hc neh t
bore the

.

. ·�Pf' 26

U.S.C. § 162 (2000).

Thus, because employers ultimately

cost of insurance, the employee-pati ents had an incentive to demand all

the health care they could get .
. .. 22 Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability far Breach
Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption far State Law
.

rifh1'.1mmy
l.111/n/it_\' f<'.r 1Wed1m� Care Decision Making, 53 FLA.
.

L. R.E.v. 1, 34 (2001) ("Tradition
a h, trea�mg p hysicians have been proud of their individua autonom
").
l
y....
nder FFS reimbursement, physicians like to tell patients
that everything possible
t� bemg dc ne (physicians have "seen themselv
es as being
�
advocate

�

�-

the patient's
"),
id., btll clomg e ery thin poss ble may not be best when
it leads physicians to pro
�
�
\ irle t l c a tm ent m fields m whJCh they
are inadequately trained and more likely to
commn error.

�

•.

.2'.�/�rg�n transp lan�� are especially expensi ve because
they have a large ini_
. requu-e
swgtcal cost,
hfe long treatment with dangerous expensive drugs and
'
ha\"l' l11gh l ong term comp l ication rates.
· .

11·11

-

'

-
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These factors ar e interrelated and inseparable. War

time price and wage controls encouraged employers to recruit

scarce \\'orkers by offering them 11011-\\'agc benefits.

A.s it became

increasingly popular for workers to recei\'l· health insurance bene
fits, more individuals were covered by third part y insurnnce, which
-

further fueled the pu blic s desire for m e d ic al
'

care. 21

The federal

government respo nd e d to this desire by subsidizing the construc
tion of community hospitals throug h the Hill-Burton pro gram.2�'
With mor e

hospitals going up,

me di cal training

programs ex

panded and, by 1980, it was clear that this expansion would soon
lead to a surplus of physicians.2(' Lurking behind all of these devel
opments was medical research, _increasingly facilitated by new devel
opments in electronics and radioisotopes27 that seemed to improve
the efficacy of the practice of medicine on a daily b asis.
Health insurance grew problematic during this period, as these
new treatments (and their related hospital care) proved

to

b e much

more expensive than prior forms of care. Most individuals could
not pay for h igh-tech health care without insurance, but because
the probability of any given pati e nt needing care was relatively low,
the cost of the insurance remained reasonable for a time. FFS re
imbursement encouraged a "do everything" mentality. Just as the
legal profession's requirement of zealous advocacy d rives lawyers to
do everything the client can afford to win cases, the medical profes
sion, drawing on essentially unlimited insurance resources, did eve
rything it could do to save patients' lives.
procedures,

This

meant more

which soon included sophisticated laboratory tests;

24. Employe1·-p a id FFS insurance means that the employee pays little or noth
ing for heal t h care. Accordingly, em ployees have an incentive to demand all possi

ble medical care, i.e., patie nts have no incentive to ask their physicians i f the
medical treatment

p re scri be d is cost-effec tive.

Thus, the third-party insurance

served as a fin a n cial in ce n t ive to over-utilize care, independent from the FFS in

centive to phys ic i a ns to over-prescribe care.

25. Hospital Survey and Constructio n (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725,
60 Stat 1040 ( 1946) (providing federa l grants to modernize hospitals that had be
come obsole t e due to Jack of capital investment throughout the period of th e
Great Depression and World War II).

26. See Eli Gi n zbu rg , Ten Encounters With the US Health Sector, 1930-1999, 282].
Ass'N 1665, 1667 (1999) (obse rvi ng that a 1980 Graduate Medical Educa
tion National Advisory Committee report had concluded that by the year 2000
th ere would be a surplus of over 150,000 physicians based on the then-current
medical sch oo l graduation r at e) .
27. Radioisotopes allow a chemical to be traced as it transverses the e nzymatic

AM.

MED.

machi nery of a cell.
Thus, radioisotopes, which arose from research on the atomic
bomb, served to e lucidate the prin ciple s of biochemistry in t he

and biomolecular e ngin ee ri ng a generation later.

1950s and 1960s,

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN IAW

290

[Vol. 60:283

election or un
however, medical training did not stress the carefu �
ans were enderstanding of diagnostic tests-instea d, phys1c1
28
esu1 ts 1a te�.
couraged to order every possible test and sort out the r.
.
sp�ciahsts
Additionally, physicians were encouraged to confer with
racu
p
such
gh
Althou
�e pat
and to refer patients for specialist care.
did
ly
general
�wt
terns resulted in escalating health care costs, they
l
harm patients, unless they resulted in unnecessary medica

�

procedures.

We term this model medical impe r ialism. Historically, its p rac
titioners have sought to treat conditions aggressively, to d evelop
new and better treatments, and to expand medical facilities and
medical technology. Medical imperialism worked very well for the
twenty-five years between 1945 and 1970, but the passage of Medi
care2!l and continued technological innovation ensured that health

care costs would soon explode.
Prior to 1970, the most significant reductions in morbidity and
mortality were due to public health p ractices (such as water purifi
cation) and effective antimicrobial t reatment. Because such mea
sures led to clear benefits (such as significant gains in life
expectancy) between

1900 and 1970, no one questioned the cost of

health care. In 1968, after the Surgeon General declared that infec
tious diseases had been conquered, medicine turned increasingly to
treatment of chronic diseases such as coronary artery disease and
cancer.

Unlike acute infectious diseases, chronic medical condi

tions proved to be much more resistant to medical therapy, even
with the application of high-tech practices. Accordingly, medical
imperialism began to become an increasingly problematic para
digm-the country was spending more on health care, but life ex
pectancy no longer increased as rapidly. This era was typified by
President Nixon's war on cancer . M odeled on the space program

28.

This uncritical habit of ordering diagnostic tests, without a clear rationale

for each tes�, also drove "defensive medicine" because physicians who do not un
d �rstand which �e�ts to o�der also do not know how to reduce the ordering of tests
.
w1tho�t jeopardmng patient care. Although p hysicians rightly worried about not

orde n�g enough tests, much diagnostic testing done under the rubric of defensive
.
med1cme
was really driven by ignorance and by the income it generated for labs.
The managed care problem aggravated physicians' litigation anxiety by forcing
them to reduce the level of diagnostic testing .
. 29: Medicare, by expa �ding FFS health insurance to a segment of the popula
u on

th�t

could not otheIWlse afford health care, increased the demand for health

care ..ve HEALTH CARE DEUVERY IN THE UNITED STATES

19�9).

160 (Antho

n

y R. Kovner &

�te \en Jonas eds., 6th ed.
Initially, this was not a problem b eca use only a
.
small
percent of the P?pulauon reached age sixty-five; today, however, thirteen
.
percent of the population 1s over age sixty-five, and that percentage will double
over the next twenty years. See id. at

511.

2004]

ERIS.-\ PREE\IPTIO:'\ I'.\: \1..\:-\.\(;ED L\RF

291

started by P r es i den t Kenned y, thl' war on ccu1<Tr was based on the
assumption that cance r was just one mon· technological problem

that could be s o lved if the gon�rnmen t put enough money into re
search and t r ea tnw n t. :10 More than thirtv vcars later, the hendiL-; of
this p ro gra m are still questionable. \i\'l�ile we ban� learn ed much
about the b io logy of cancer, what we han· learned is that cancer is
thousands of differ e n t diseases that han· pro\'ed n·ry resis tant to

cure. There have been

m ; �jor

brea kthro ughs in the treatment of

some relatively rare cancers, bu t little progress in treating the m<�jor

killers .:11 The result of this is that ever more money is spent on
treatment<; yielding little incremental improvement.:1'.! Ironically,

however, expenditure of monetary and political capital on the pre
vention of smoking (the leading cause of preventable cancer) is

tiny compared to the money spent for the treatment of its related
illnesses.

Another model for chronic disease raises an even greater spec
ter of medical inflation. Unlike coronary artery disease or cancer,
.
patients with diabetes can live for a long time with their disease.:-i=�
Type I diabetes occurs in childhood or early adolescence and
m�nifests without regard to dietary or other environmental causes.
Pnor to the development of insulin, children with diabetes died at

an early age. Indeed, insulin has totally changed the natural history
of this disease because type I diabetics can easily live forty or fifty
years with their condition if it is treated with insulin. This length
ened life expectancy means that most patients will develop one or
more costly-to-treat complications over the course of the disease.34
A type II diabetic is at risk to develop all of the complications of
type I diabetes. Like type I diabetes, type II has a multifactorial
etiology. However, type II diabetes has its onset later in life, and
the major fact
or triggering type II diabetes in susceptible p ersons is
30. National Cancer Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-218, 85 Stat. 778.
31. Much of the improvement in cancer t reatments comes from simple efforts

to better
educ ate patients: as patients are now much better aware of the sign and
sy mptoms
of cance r, and have access to health care, they present for treatment at
an earlie
r stage. Fifty years ago, it was not unusual for a woman with breast cancer
to present
only whe n the cancer had grown through her skin and d eveloped a
alod orous seco
ndary i nfection. Today most women present with a painless small
reast mass,
which is much easier to treat.

�

.
32. Much of Medicare spending accrues during the final months of a palient's life.

33. Obesity is another chronic medical condition that is compatibl e with a
1 0ng life.

34. The primary complications of diabetes are renal failure, retinopathy, and
n e u rop athy .
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obesity. Over the past twenty-five years the p� evalence <?f obesity
has nearly doubled in the United States,35 and m the commg years,
the prevalence o f type II diabetes can also be expected to double.
This has important implications if America attempts to control
medical inflation by the use of guideline-driven protocols. The In
.
stitute of Medicine (IOM), is undoubtedly correct that care guide
lines will help control cost today . However, as the total population
increases, and the percentage of obese individuals within the total
population increases, health care costs will continue to r se becau se
.
there will be many more individuals with the complications of dia
betes. This is a major reason why the United States is poised to
invest $100 million dollars per year on the prevention o f diabetes,
obesity, and such similarly preventable chronic conditions as
asthma.36

�

Medical imperialism also drives the pharmaceutical industry.
Total spending on prescription drugs increased by over three hun
dred percent between 1991 and 2001. 37 Drugs are developed based
on their potential market, which is a combination of the number of
affected persons and their willingness and ability to pay for relief.
Most drugs are very cheap to manufacture, their main costs being
the initial research and clinical trials necessar y to get FDA approval.
This means that drug companies d epend on patent law to protect
their profits. Once a drug is no longer under patent protection, it
can be cheaply manufactured by a competitor, and its price and
profitability will fall rapidly. Because the clock begins to run on
n�w drugs even before they are in the marketplace, drug compa
mes ofte� have a s few as ten years of patent exclusivity. For many
years this system worked very well, producing new drugs that
worked dramatically better than those that they replaced, reducing
both patient suffering and overall health care costs. Currently,

:��.

Approximately twenty percent of the U.S. population is obese.
%. Brook Raflo, Bush's Budget to Fund Shift to Home Care, HoMECARE, Feb .

200'.I. at 10. Of course, many in the preventive medicine industry are poised to
��ke ach-antage of the coming preventive healthcare market. See S usan Orenstein,

lluPill that Will Make You Thin, Business 2.0 (Mar., 2004), available at http:/ /www.
bmmess2.com/h2/web/articles/ 1, 17863,591634,00.html (describing attempts by
.
mant�facturers to develop and market a pill that reduces the desire
lrn
cons� 1mpuon) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law) .

phar'.nac�uucal
c'.ilone

.n. PR1cr:'A".·\TERHousECoorERs, CosT oF CARINc: KEY
DRIVERS oF GROWTH IN
s.l'.F:\lllN(; ()� Hosrrr..\l. CARE 6 (2003)' availabl,e
at http://www.pwcglobal.com/

�.xtwt"b/ serncc-.nsfI 8b9d788097dff3c9852565eOOOncOba/bf4bl l 2 l 34b51 ce78525
hrcl:IOO�:i4249 /$ �- I l .E/Final%20Executive% 20Summary%20021903. pdf (report

u:g. an. 11�crease

m

national spending on prescription medication from 5.9% of

1991 _to
of$1.42 trillion in 2001) (on file with the NYU An1111.11 Sunt'\' of .'\nwncan I.aw).

Sihl t_i1lhon

m

�l.9%
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many new drugs offer marginal or no benefits t o most patients
when compared with existing remedies; however, these new drugs
cost much more than existing drugs.:18 To be profitable, drug man
ufacturers must persuade physicians to prescribe these new drugs
for patients who would be better served by cheaper, better, and
safer older drugs.39 Now, biotechnology is promising drugs tailored
to an individual's own genetic makeup, but at astronomical costs
and with no assurance that benefits will be significantly better than
existing therapy's. At the same time, private foundations are left to
satisfy the critical need for public-health drugs in the developing
world, and for the poor in the United States, as there is no one to
pay drug manufacturers for drugs that they might develop to ad
dress these needs.
There are three key failings of medical imperialism. First, it
applies a "cost is no object to cure the patient" model to chronic
diseases that have no cure and that can only be managed and pre
vented. 40 This model evolved from an earlier, unconstrained, fee
for-service system. The increase in the number and costs of treat
ments for chronic diseases, coupled with the dramatic rise in per38. Claritin, which recently went off-patent, offers only minor benefits over
generic antihistamines, but costs one d ollar a day versus a few pennies. Similarly, a
recent study has demonstrated that the most cost-effective treatment for essential
hypertension is a cheap diuretic, rather than the many patented antihypertensive
agents on the market that sell for substantially more money. See Lawrence J. Ap
pel, The Verdict From ALLHAT-Thiazide Diuretics Are the Preferred Initial Therapy far

283 J. AM. MED. Ass'N, 3039-42 (2002).
39. The general scheme of inducing a physician to prescribe a new drug is
s�nding a good-looking sales person to call on the physician and supply the physi
CJan with a gift. While these gifts for years were only to have token value, the sales
representatives have proven that they can adroitly disguise the value of the gift.
Accordingly, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has recentl y issued new phar
maceutical regulations intended to prevent the abuse of this relationship. See CoM.
Hypertension,

PLIANCE

PROGRAM

GUIDANCE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS,

avai/,abl,e at

http:/ I oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/042803pharmacymfgnonfr.
pdf (Apr. 2003) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law).
40. FFS reimbursement encourages physicians to over-treat, to be uncritical
about the drug company claims for new and expensive dmgs, and to do surgical
procedures with questionable indications. For example, coronary artery bypass
surgery has bee n shown to improve longevity and quality of life for certain middle
ag_e d patients. It is now widely used i n elderly patients even though there is no
evidence that it improves either longevity or quality of life. End-state renal disease
(ESRD), which requires dialysis to prolong the patient's life, was a rare but serious
condition in the 1960s. The federal government set up a special program to pay
for dialysis a n d within 20 years it was p aying dramatically more patients than were
predicted to exist. Kidney disease did not become more common, but physicians,
who made huge profits from dialysis centers, became very creative in expandinl{
the diagnosis of ESRD.
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sons with chronic diseases, accounts for most of medical inflation.
Second, medical imperialism draws political and financ i al su �port
from prevention efforts that can reduce the incidence of medically
costly diseases. Alcoholism, HIV, a n d gun violen � e a ccount fo r a
.
huge financial burden on urban hospitals. Obesity a n d smok� n?

affect all segments of health care. Yet America has expended mm1-

mal effort in preventing these problems-instead, we wait until a
patient has acquired an advanced disease from these factor� , at
which time we apply costly and tec hnologically complex soluuons
to the exacerbated problem.41

Third, medical imperialism at

tempts to "rnedicalize" all social p roblems so that they are treated
with medications. This practice expands the umbrella of treatable
conditions and
everyone.42

thereby increase s

the cost of health

care for

Medicalizing psycho-social problems is a phenomenon well-il
lustrated by the current treatment of alcohol and drug abuse. Only
a few generations ago, these problems were classified a s personal
moral failures; today, alcoholism and drug abuse are c lassified as
treatable conditions. While treatme nt for such problems can be
beneficial to individuals, it is also costly, and adds to the health care
budget. Moreover, some have argued that medicalizing a condition
may reduce people' s fear of that condition, and cause them to be
less interested in preventing its o n set.4� Interestingly, when society
does benefit from providing medical treatment for social condi
tions, the avoidance of future medical treatment, and hence costs,
is never contemplated. Any benefits to society in r e habili tating
drunks or drug addicts are not subtracted from the medical budget,
so the net result is always more costs with no credit for the benefits.
N ursing homes are another manifestation of the n a tion's de
sire to "fix" societal problems tha t stem from cultural changes.
4 1 . D i�betes ill ustrates a further problem because its complications are much
.
less snere tf th � d 1sease is carefully managed in the early stages. Many health
�tans and most � n d .1gent care systems make it difficult for patients to get this care
h�I ca.r� , mcr�asmg the rate of complicatio n s such as kidney and heart d isease and
d1sab1hty , which are much more expensive to treat.

. 42. F? r exam le consider the prescriptio n of Ritalin to "hyperactive" chil
�
dicn . V\11 1\e the re is no doubt that some children benefit
from being o n this medi
.
�auo�, many children are place� on Ritalin as a means of treating a dysfunctional
fanuly.
ot only does the Ritahn have to be paid for, but so does the medical
momton ng cost associated with long-term medica
tion of childre n.
Harvey Fie r� tem,
·
�oted gay wnter a n d actor, makes a powerful argument
that the medicah. zatton ol HIV has led gay
men to think that it is treatable and
does not need to worrv
, th em, that It may even be seen as cool to have HIV. See
..
.
Haiwv hcrste m , Thf' Culture of Dismse, N .Y. TIMES, J
uly 3 1 , 2003, a t A25 .

�

43
·

·

·

.

.

·

2004 1

ERISA PREDIPTIO:\' I :\' \l:\:\:\(;ED < ARE

Nursing h o m e care. one of t h e largest componen ts of Medic aid, is
as mu c h a reflection of t h e brea kdown o f the trad i t i o n a l familv and
the one-i n co m e household as it is a medical care issue. Ho\�'e\·er,
the conseq u e n tial cost of providing c ustodial care for the elderly is
substan tial , especially when Am e ri c a ' s health care cosL'i are com
pared with th ose of other countries:"'

C.

The

/ntrodurtion of Managnl

Carp

Med ical i nflation first appeared in the late 1 960s;F• touch ing
off approx i m a tely two decades d u ri ng which general i n fl a tion and
medical inflation in particular skyroc keted.41; General i n flation may
have been d riven by the need to pay for the Vietnam \i\'ar and the
Arab oil e m b a rgo, but the origi n s of medical inflati o n are more
complex.

Medical inflation is n o t merely the result of providers

overutilizing expensive high-tech m edical procedures to m aximize
their own self-in terest.47 Instead, six factors drive m ed i c a l i nflation:

( 1 ) health c a re p roviders offer new services that grea tly i m prove
outcomes b u t e i ther cost more t h a n existing treatme n ts or have no
existing analog;

( 2 ) demographic s h ifts increase the number of eld
erly persons n e eding medical servi ces;48 (3) lifestyle a n d environ

mental diseases increase the n u m b e r of persons need i n g medical
s � rvices; ( 4) h ealth care providers charge more f o r the same ser

vices;

(5) h e a l th care providers offe r new services to gain market

44. W hile the U nited States spends m u c h more o n h e alth ca re than European
coun tries such as Germany, Germany s p e n ds much more on the total social wel
far� bund le, i n c l u d ing health care, than does the United States. People in the

Umted State s, e s p e c ially those in the l ower socio-economic strata, are much less
healthy than they co ld be if they were better educated, had access to social wel
u
fare servi ces designed to improve health a n d prevent disease, and if the environ
� e�tal causes for disease states such as obesity were better controll ed. To a
significa n t exte n t , the U . S. health care system is much more expensive than com
parabl e Europ ean countries' because we do not properly allocate social welfare
spending and social costs in other sectors.

45 . See Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1 999: Hearing on HR. 1304 Be/om the
House Co mm. on the judiciary, I 06th Cong. 122, 1 24 ( 1 999) (statemen t of Don
Yo ung, M . D . , C h ief
Operating Officer a n d Medical Director of the H e alth Insur
ance Associatio n of America)
.

46. Mark A. Hall , Instit utional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barril'T"s to
Health Care Cost Contain ment, 1 37 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 435 ( 1 988) .
47. Physic ians c ertainly thrived under FFS, and continued to d o so even
un der man aged
care. During the decade of 1 986 to 1 996, physician income in
creased seven
ty-seven percent to a median n e t income of $ 1 66,000, while the aver
age worke r' s income
increased only forty-three percent to a median n e t income of
$ 25 ,480. LARRY L
EVITT & JANET LUNDY, H ENRY J. KAISE R FAM . FOUND . • T REN DS AND
IND ICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 65 ( 1 99 8 ) .

48. Examples i nclude the increasing n umber of obese and elderly persons.
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share or increase profits that are more costly but have little benefit
over existing services, or offer unne cessary services;49 and
services are put under the medical umbrella.

(6) more

That managed care alone would not be able to control medical
inflation is obvious, in hindsight, because managed care cannot ad
dress factors o n e through three without denying individuals n eces
_
sary care. This problem is addressed in a thoughtful article by
David Orentlicher, who argues that managed care faile d because
the American public will not stand for rationing health c are:
Managed care has failed not because of market imperfe c tions,
a bad design, or because its design was poorly executed.
Rather, the U nited States' experience with managed c ar e illus
trates what happens when society tries to ration health care re
sources, regardless of the mechanism used for rationing.

In

this view, problems with the health care market or the design
and impleme n tation of managed care might have affe cted h ow
quickly managed care failed, but they did not affect whether
managed care would fail.50
Professor Ore n tlicher draws on the classic work Tragic Choices, by
Guido Calabresi and Phillip Bobbitt. The theme of Orentlicher's
article is that Americans will not stand for rationing life-savin g med
ical care, and that managed care was doomed to fail because it was a
rationing system"1 that could succeed only as long as it c ould hide
the rationing behind the rhetoric of reducing unnecessary care and
improving quality of care. Orentlic h e r concludes on the b l e ak note
that the future will only see a continuing shifting betwee n subter
fuges for rationing, with the publi c r ejecting each app r o ac h as its
injustices become widely appreciated.52 For example, Orentlicher
P?sits that practice guidelines are only a rationing subterfuge that
_
_
d1sgu1ses va ue choICes about the proper way to spend m edical care
dollars behmd a fa�ade of scientific detachment.

�

We believe that this bleak analysis is fundamentally correct as
concerns factors one and two. We b elieve that the Unite d States
Supre n:e Court shif�ed its views o n ERISA preemption because it
.
recogmzed the pohtICal and social i mplications of allowing h ealth
49. The drug industry provides many examples,
such as new hypertension
�rngs that are very expensive but not as effective as older
agents in m ost patients.
S1•r .111/1m note 38.

. _50;,

Uw1rP.1

:1 1 .

David Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictab
l,e Tragic
Phn1omenon, 47 ST. Louis U. LJ. 4 1 1 , 4 1 2 (2003) .
Si't> id. at 4 1 3.

'.;2. Ir/. at

"
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care rationing decisions to be made without public recourse. This
shift is ch ronicled in Parts II and III of this article.
We differ with Professor Orentlicher as to his opinions on fac
tors fou r and five, which we believe can be addressed by managing
physician decisionmaking, and which we believe will make a signifi
cant difference in medical inflation. Factor three, which is the most
critical of these problems, is beyond the reach of managed care and
must be addressed though state and federal political action. (Fac
tor six j u s t demands honesty in political debate, which makes it the
least likely to be addressed. )

Thus the dilemma in managed care:

how do you sort out areas where costs can be contained without
hurting the quality of care-factors four and five-from areas
where cost containment must h urt the quality of care-factors one
and two?
II.

THE RISE OF ERISA MCOS
By 1 970, medical inflation was a political issue.

The Federal

Health Maintenance Organization Act of 197353 was p assed to stim
ulate the development of man aged care insurance p roducts that
would, ideally, help to control health care cost by decreasing medi
cal imperialism' s overutilization of high-tech health care. The key
feature of the Federal MCO Act was its formal recognition that cost
�ontainment measures can b e an appropriate part of health
Insu rance. 5 4
Managed care uses two fundamental strategies to control
c?sts. 55 One strategy is to leave the actual care decisions to physi
cians and other health care providers, but cap the amount of
money they would be paid for the care of individual patients or
groups of patients. Providers who deliver care for less than the pay53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-l 7 (2000).
54. See Brooks Richardson, Health Care: /<,'RISA Preemption and HMO Liability
A Fresh Look at ERISA Preemption in the Context of Subscriber Claims Against HMOs, 49
OKLA. L. RE.v. 677, 687-88 (1 996) ( Th e "basic premise i n every state and federal
HMO Act remains the same: HMOs should be encouraged to operate within the
health care market to promote efficiency and economy.").
55. Managed care i s enforced through physician financial i n ce n tives and eco
nomic crede n tialing. An HMO, for example, would withhold u p to twenty percent
of a physician 's income until that physician reached his or her utilization targe t5 .
Economic credentialing is rese rved for those recalcitrant physicians who repeat
edly do not meet their utilization goals in spite of the financial incentives: under
such circumstances the physician con tract is simply not offered to the physician at
the time of annual renewal.
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ment make money, and those whose care costs more lose money.5 6
.
The second strategy is to inteIVene directly in medical care d� c1sions by requiring pre-authorization for any but the m o s t routme
care, and by excluding some treatments from policy c overage.57
Both of these strategies create conflicts of interest for h e�l th care
.
providers that differ from those of FFS, and both result m cla�ms

that plans are directly or indirectly responsible for patients bemg
denied medically necessary care.58 Initially, states attempted to
control these s trategies by mandatin g health benefits, while private
attorneys filed medical malpractice suits against plans for inj uries
allegedly cause d by denial of care.

A year after the passage of the Federal MCO Act, Congress en
acted ERISA. The intent of ERISA was to provide a u niform na
tional set of laws governing pension plans so that national
employers such as General Motors could bargain with local unions
and have uniform national contracts. ERISA achieves this goal by
providing comprehensive and detailed guidance for pension plans,
and explicitly p reempting any state regulation of ERISA-sheltered
activities. However, there is virtually no mention of health plans in
ERISA.'•!1 The o nly sentence in ERISA that mentions h ealth plans is
found in the Act's preamble, which defines the scope of the cover
age of ERISA. 60
When the courts began to consider cases involving ERISA
health plans, they looked to pension plan rules and to ERISA' s pre
emption of any state law that "relates t o" an ERISA plan .61 With out
:lfi. O n e strategy, used extensively by Me dicare for controlling hospitalization
on diagnosis-related groups (DRG) . Hospi

.
costs. was fi�ed-cost budgetmg
based
tals '�ere paid a fixed amount based

on the patient's diagnosis. If the care they
.
pnmdcd exceeded the DRG payment, they lost money. If it was less than the DRG
parnicnt, they ��de mo � ey. Some private i n surers used a similar fixed budget
s: st m .for physi c ian s.ervices, paying physician groups a capitation payme nt-a
1_m d. P•l\ lll e n t p e r patient. If the group could treat the patients for less than th e
l .ipn.nion pay� ent, they made money. Sin c e health insurance requires large
.
numbers of patients m the pool to average out costs, most medical groups did not
· h th
Inn·
'
la rge enoug h poo I s Wll
e same insurer, and consequently lost money on
thl'se arrangements.
:li. A concise summary of prospective utilizatio
n review can be found in
n111u�1 1 ' · '.1wnle Health Care Systems, Inc. 1 85 F.3d 1, 1-6 ( 1 st Cir. 1 999) .
�H. S,pp McLe an & Richards, supra note 22, at 1 7-19.
:l9. Becau·se medical inflau·on was
·
no t an issue pnor
to 197 O ' 1t is not surpns.
.
111�
Congress provi ded little guidan ce for health
plans.
.
. Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 § 2 , 29 U.S.C.
.
� 1 00 1 ( b) (statmg
that a purpose of the Act is to protect interest
s of "participants
:
Ill t•mplovl'e benef it plans" ).
�
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 § 5 1 4 (a) , 29 U.S.C.

�

·

·

l�t:'

J J .�i.: ( a;'"

·

·
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more to flesh out Congressional intent, the courts concluded that
any state law remotely related to ERISA health plans was pre
empted. 62 This expansive view of ERISA preemption was con
firmed i n the early 1980s by two Supreme Court cases.
The first of these cases was Metropolitan Life Ins urance

v.

Massa

chusetts, 63 which concerned s tate-mandated mental health coverage.
Specifically, the State of Massachusetts set o u t minimal mental
health c overage requirements that all insurers were expected to
provide in their contracts of insurance, but Metropolitan Life Insur
ance argued that it did not n e e d to provide this mandated mental
health c overage in insurance c o ntracts sold to E RISA plans. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the state law was
not preempted by ERISA, a n d the U.S. Supreme Court took the
case on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the state law
was one that regulated the business of insurance and thus was saved
from E RI SA preemption by the E RISA saving clause.64 However,
the Court was careful to note that this law applied only to the con
tracts of insurance purchase d by ERISA plans, not t o the ERISA
plans themselves. As the Court recognized, this decision would cre
ate a double standard, with "plans that purchase insurance" (in
sured p l ans) subject to the s tate mandated benefits laws, but plans
that self-insured, and thus did not purchase i n s u rance, exempt
from the benefits mandate. 65 Thus, while the Metropolitan Life
Court found that the specific state statute was n o t preempted by
ERISA, i t cleared the way for ERISA plans to avoid such mandates
by self-insuring, rather than by purchasing insurance contracts
from third party insurers.
The second of these two cases, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insur
ance v. Russell,66 involved a woman who was temporarily denied disa
bility benefits due to a dispute with her disability i nsurer over the
nature of her illness. While h e r benefits were eventually restored,
62. ERISA actually contemplates two forms of preemptio n : c omplete preemp
tion under § 502 and conflict preemption under § 514. See, e.g. , Roark v. Humana,
Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2002 ) ; Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 1 72
F.3d 332, 336-37 ( 5th Cir. 1 999) . Although this distinction is important to ERISA
litigation, further discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
63. 471 U . S. 724 ( 1 985 ) .

64. Id. at 744.
65. Id. at 724 ( "We are aware that our decision results i n a distinction between
insured a n d uninsured plans, leavin g the former open to indirect regulation while
the latter are not. By so doing we m e rely give life to a distin ction created by Con
gress in the ' deemer clause , ' a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has
chosen n o t to alter.") .
66. 473 U.S. 1 34 ( 1985 ) .
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she sued the plan fiduciary for damages arising from the p er.iod
during which the benefits were stopped, ar�ing that th : fi duoary
breached its duty to her by conducting an improper review of her
medical condition. The Supreme Court held that the duty of the
plan's fiduciary ran to the plan, not to the insureds, and thus ERISA
preempted the plaintiffs claim for money damages from the plan
fiduciary.67
Russell is a pivotal case in medical ERISA jurisprudence , and its
holding was extended in subsequent cases to ban money damages

for prospective utilization review. 68

After

Russell,

many assumed

that states could not individually re gulate an ERISA MCO's pro
spective utilization review.

Unfortunately, prospective utilization

can be easily manipulated by creating incentives for physicians to
misclassify a patient' s conditions so that expensive care i s not classi
fied as medically necessary under the plan's guidelines.69 Such in
centives became commonplace because MCOs are not re quired to
disclose provider incentive packages ,70 and because physi c ians had
little power to bargain over these incentives once MCOs captured a
majority of insured lives where the physician practiced.71
Similarly,

Russell's holding on

the nature of allowable d amages ,

while technically correct, created havoc. ERISA only contemplates
equitable relief as it is defined within the statute,12 through lan
guage that has increasingly been in terpre ted as referrin g only to
such "categories of relief' as " inj unction [s] , mandamus, and restitu67. Id. at 1 40-44.

infra note 94 and accompanyin g text.
69. For example, a CT scan is generally not medically indicated for head

68. See

aches. Thus, a prospective utilization review decision that denies a head CT scan
as � benefit unless the headache is severe/acute or else persistent is entirely appro
pn � te. But, if t e HMO p rovi des incentives for a physician not to properly take
n ou e d1at a pati e n t ' s headache is severe/acute or persistent
�
so as to cut its cost for
prond1 ? g tr�a�� �nt, the HMO is abusing the utilization review as a method to
determin e ehg1b1hty for benefits . See, e. g. , Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
958 F. Supp. 1 1 37, 1 1 39-40 (E.D.Va. 1997) .

�

70. Pete r�on v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 2 0 00 WL 1 708787, at *7 (E.D .Pa. Nov.
_
1 5 .. 2000) (fa1lmg
t� find in the Third Circuit any " 'ringing endorsement' of such a
u mve r�al , auto � auc d�ty upon all HMOs to disclose every aspect of their physician

.
fina� cial mcenuves
wnhout a request from the participant or without any other
.
spe�1al c1 �cumstan �e " ) ; Mai o v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 493 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting
RICO claim for failure to disclose) .
to

7 1 . Under such situations, i t is financially impossible
for physicians to refuse

deal with the MCO.

.7.2· . Employe e R�ti rement Income Security Act of 1974 §
502(a) ( 3) , 29 U.S.C.
.
L �2�·1) (�) (authonz _mg parties
to seek injunctio ns or "other appropri ate equita
ble n:hef. as n ec essa ry ) .
s 1

�

�00·1 I

E R I S:\ PREE\I PT I O '.\: I :\ �l:\\::\C ;1·:D C :..\RE

:w t

tio n , b u t not c o m pe nsa tor y damag e s . . . _ " 7:1 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a
breach of c o n tract action, as i n Hu.'i.\f'!/, is '"q u i n tesse n t ially a n ac
tion at l aw . '

"7 1

a n d can n o t b(' c h a ract erized u n d e r E R I SA as "an

i 1tj u n ction to com pel t h e payme n t of lllOIH'Y past du(' un dc:r a con
tract, or s p ec ifi c performance: of a past d u e mo nc: tary o b l i ga t i on .

Russell's

"

7,-.

e n graft m e n t of pen sion p l a n -sty le analysi s onto a n in

vestigation i n to hea l th plan adm i n is trative malfeasan c e re m a i ns the
standard legal ap proach to such issues, even though the calc ulus
often p r o d u c e s perverse outcoines. 71;

These perverse legal out

comes were made worse where participants in non-E RISA MC:Os
were able to recover damages if th eir plan's prospec tive utilization
review process wrongfully den ied care.n

The presu m p tion that

prospective u t i l ization review was protected under ERISA provided
ERISA HMOs with a competitive advan tage in the m arketplace,
thereby fostering the developm e n t of many other forms of man
aged care products.78
In short,

Metropolitan Life and Russell preven t states

from either

defining mini mal benefits or regulating prospective utilization re
view of ERISA qualified H MOs, a nd p laintiffs' attorn eys h ave had
only mixed success in re-charac terizing prospective u ti lizati o n re
view as medical malpractice. 79 The problem with re-c haracterizing
7 3. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs. , 508 U.S. 248, 256 ( 1 993) .
7 4. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. ' H ealth & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 2 1 3 F.3d
398, 401 ( 7 th Cir. 2000) ("A claim for money due and owing under a con tract is
'quintessentially an action at law. "') (citing Hudson View I I Assoc. v. Gooden, 644
N.Y.S.2d 5 1 2, 5 1 6 (App. Div. 1996) ) .
75. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U . S . 204, 2 1 0-1 1
(2002) .
76. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1 32 1 , 1 324,
1 33 7- 38 (5th Cir. 1 992) (ERISA preemption precludes emotional d istress claim

for pare nts whose unborn child died as a result of employee disability plan 's use of
prospective utilization review) .

77 . See, e.g. , Fox v. Health Net, 1 99 3 WL 7 94305 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside

Cty., Dec. 23, 1 99 3 ) (state court jury awarded $89,128, 1 53 in damages, including
punitive damages, against a plan that delayed the patient's receipt of what was
cons idere d at the time to be an experimen tal treatment) .

78. MCOs i nclude other types of organizations, such as Preferred Provider

Organ izations ( PPOs) . There are many distinctions between PPOs and HMOs: for
example, HMOs wield much greater con trol over the health care providers that
are available to patients. HMOs are discussed i n greater detail in this article be
cause they provide the clearest examples.

79. Co mpare State Bd. of Reg. for the Healing Arts v. Fallo n , 41 S.W. 3d 474,
(Mo. 2 00 1 ) (finding that MCO medical director's decision to override phy
sici an's medical decision was not entitled to ERISA preemptio n ) , and Murphy v.
Bd of Med. Exam 'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 998) (finding that review
:

�7?-77

by i nsu rance company employee of physician 's medical decisi ons is itself a medical
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an administrative m alfeasance action predicated on prospective
utilization review as a medical malpractice action80 is tha t state tort
law can be viewed as a form of state regulation8 1 related to E RISA.
Specifically, this created the perception that ERISA h ealth plans
were beyond s tate statutory and common law, leading ERISA M COs
to conclude that they could deny care without fear of subsequent
litigation (provided that the plan itself was not delivering medical
services, so as to open the door to a potential vicarious liability ac
tion) .82 Early ERISA MCOs had an additional financial edge be
cause they did not need to acquire insurance for either malp ractice
or omissions and errors related to medical care.83 Accordingly, a
number of MCOs regularly denied medical care to patients under
the assumption that they could n o t be found liable for a wrongful
decision.

III.
THE END OF ERISA PREEMPTION
Soon, there began to be horror stories of MCOs ordering
mothers out of the hospital within twenty-four hours of delivering a
child, or middle-age males with atypical chest pain undergoing car
diac arrest after their MCOs refused to authorize appropriate m edi
cal workups.84
years af er

�

Although it took the Supreme Court over fifteen

Rus�ell

to revisit its m edical ERISA jurisprudence, the

Court did so with a vengeance in a series of three cases.
decision, rather than an insurance decisio n ) , with United Healthcare I ns. Co. v.
Levy . 1 1 4 F. S p . 2d 55 • 564 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that medical board' s
?.
� �
_
attempt to dtsClplme
phys1c1an based on coverage decision was preempted by ER
ISA as de facto attempt by state to mandate benefits) .
80. Dukes v. D.S. Healt?c re, Inc., 57 F . 3 d 350, 351-52 ( 1 99 5 ) (successfully
�
_
. .
stating
such a claim
and avo1dmg ERISA preemption) .

�l. '

See, e.g. , Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 ( 1 992) (char
actenzmg certain health-related state laws as preempted regulatio n)
.
_
82. See,
e.g. , Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlan tic States,
In ., 958 F.Sup p. 1 1 37, 1 1 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1 997) ( refusing
to grant motion to dis�
.
·
.
·
miss claim of v1canou
s Iiab1' l'ty
1
against MCO , wh ere there was an agency relat1on.
ship betwee n the MCO and an allegedly n eglige
nt physician ) .
83. Su Quality Chasm , supra note 1 4, at
279.
84. SeP, e.g., In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc. , 1 9 3 F.3d
1 5 1 , 1 56 ( 3 d Cir. 1 999)
(MC ,.O rule encouraged discharge of moth e r and
child from hospital withi n
tours f birt ) ; Shea v. Esenst e n , 1 07 F.3d
625, 626 (8th Cir. 1 997)
o_
�
ai e
to r�ler patient to heart spe cialist despite a number of symptoms
r ; ,s
. u n g heart
·s uggt
d isease, resulting in patien t's death severa month late
r).
l
s

�,�.��g-���\r �
.
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Pegram v. H erdrich : State Authority over

Individual Prospective Utilization Review Decisions

The first Supreme Court medical ERISA case after Russell was
Pegram v. Herdrich.85 After Cynthia Herdrich had recovered from

an app e n d ectomy, she brought suit against her MCO for wrongful
denial of care, alleging that her MCO had breached its fiduciary
duties to her by denying auth o rization for the appendectomy for
over a week, thereby complicating her recovery.

The MCO re

sponded that because it was an ERISA-qualified plan, ERISA pre
empted state review of its prospective utilization review decision to
deny authorization of the appendectomy. Justic e Souter's unani
mous opin ion narrowly defi n e d the ERISA health plan:
Thus, when employers c o ntract with an HMO to provide bene
fits to employees subj ect to E RISA, the provisions of docu
ments that set up the HMO are not, as such, a n ERISA plan;
but the agreement betwee n an HMO and an employer who
pays the premiums may, as h ere , provide elem e n ts of a plan by
setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to
care.86
Still, even under a narrow definition of an ERISA plan, prospective
utilizatio n review, because i t defines eligibility for benefits, is re
lated to the plan. In this cas e , a s in most cases of MCO administra
tive malfe asance, a physician ' s j udgment was potentially corrupted
by the MCO's financial incentive package-e.g. , if Dr. Pegram de
nied n e e d e d medical care to e n o ugh patients, she would receive a
bonus.87 In a non-ERISA MCO , there is a check against prospective
utilization review abuse: the threat of a medical malpractice action
against both the physician and the MCO. Pegram d i d nothing to
curb physician financial incentive packages; to the contrary, the Su
preme Court specifically indicated that prospective utilization re
view and physician incentive plans were integral components of an
ERISA MCO because they were necessary to con trol health care
costs.
Pegram did, however, create a set of rules that can be used to
identify when an ERISA MCO is abusing-by any m e chanism-the
prospective utilization review process. According to Justice Souter,
an ERISA MCO can make only three types of decisions concerning
85. 530 U.S. 2 1 1 (2000 ) .
86. Id. a t 223.
87. Prior to this case, the plaintiff's bar had, at the appellate level, been chip
ping away at the ERISA preemptive shield of prospective utilization review using a
theory that the MCO had breached either its statutory or common law fiduciary
duties to the patient-beneficiary. See alw McLean & Richards, supra note 22, at 1 2.
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beneficiaries: ( 1) a pure eligibility decision; (2) a pure medical
treatment decision; or (3) a mixed eligibility-medical decision.88 Ar;
it has done since the time of Metropolitan Life, the Court held that
where an MCO makes a pure eligibility decision-wheth e r the plan
provides coverage for the treatment r egardless of the patie nt's m ed
.
.
ical condition-that decision is entitled to preemption protect10n
from state law because the decision is related to the plan . 89 The
characteristics of a pure eligibility decision are that the decision is
categorical, applicable to all beneficiaries, and one that can be an
swered "yes" o r "no" without any patient-specific information .
On the other hand, if any part of the MCO decisio n involves a
medical decision-a decision that required patient-specific knowl
edge-the decision must be characterized as either a mixed eligibil
ity/treatment decision or a pure medical treatment decision. From
a practical point of view, it does n o t matter whether the MCO's
decision is deemed a mixed eligibility treatment decisio n or a pure
medical decision: both decisions are unrelated to ERISA plans and
therefore are not entitled to ERISA preemption protection, as they
occur outside of the scope of ERISA. In short, when an MCO
· makes either a mixed eligibility treatment decision or a pure medi
cal decision, that decision is subj e ct to regulation by state law,
rather than ERISA.90 Therefore, Pegram made it clear for the first
time that some prospective utilizatio n review decisions may expose
MCOs to medical malpractice liability.91
88. 530 U.S. at 228-30.

89. Id. at 230 (using as an example a scenario in which the question is simply
see Pryzbowski v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 279 (3rd Cir 200 1 ) .

"whether a plan covers an undisputed case of appendicitis") ;

90. Id. a� 237 ("yv_e hold that mixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians

are not fiduciary dec1s10ns under ERISA. " ) .

9 1 . This can be seen i� subsequent cases, such as Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d
1 08� , 1?�6 (Pa. 2?0 1 ) (holdmg that prospective utilization review decisions involv
in g mdlVldual pauent medical information are mixed processes not e n titled to ER
.
lSA preemption ) · Mor�o�er, cases decided subsequent to Pegram suggest that the
.
. .
threshold for findmg hab1hty 1s lower when denial of care is determined by the
party respo �sible for p a�en '. See Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 250 (3d Cir.
�
2000) (findm� potenu_ �l hab1hty where financial incentives may affect the quality,
r�ther �han simply existence, of care provided by MCO employe
es) ; Berger v.
v �gn n F und. , 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3832, * 1 1-*12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2000)
( mg .to �nd complete preemption where MCO referred patient to program
wnh whICh 1t had financial dea1.mgs, an d w
h'ICh proved unsuccessful at treatmg
.
pauei:t's �onditio n) But see HCA Health
Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health
2�� F.3d �82, l ?O� � -38 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2 00 1 ) (suggesting that Pegram ' s rules
only
1t there is bodily IIlJUry clearly e ligible for
Y
P
'I
treatment) · Rubin-Sch neider
. Behavio
man '" Ment
ral Care Corp., 1 63 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 ( S .D.N.Y. 2 001 )

��
.a1

�11��. ,co. ,

�

·

·
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From a regulatory point o f view, although Pegram made it clear
that MCOs could no longer e ngage in prospective utilization review
with impunity, the case also p oints out a way for MCOs to obtain
freedom from liability for th eir decisions. Specifically, to the extent
that MCOs can shift the responsibility for making mixed decisions
and pure m edical care decisions to independent physicians, they
may b e able to avoid liability.92 This explains why, i n the wake of

Pegram, some MCOs started advertising that they were leaving medi
cal decisions to doctors-MCOs were not giving d octors a blank
check; th e y were merely shiftin g their means of c o n trol over medi
cal decisio n m aking from di rect review to the implementation of in
direct

financial

incentives.

Pegram

recognized

that

ERISA

contemplates that MCOs will try to reduce the cost of medical care,
and that they may use inc e n tives to achieve such cost reductions.
Many MCOs used "hold-back" pools, which retai n e d a certain frac
tion of the p ayments due to th eir plan physicians, and paid the re
tained fun ds only if an end-of-year audit showed that physicians had
met the plan's goals for limiti n g medical care expenses. In addition
to financ ial incentives designe d to reward physicians who met cost
control goals, MCOs also u s e d economic credentialing to remove
physicians from their rolls who consistently missed their cost con
trol targets.
States recognized these attempts to influenc e physician deci
sionmaking without triggerin g the Pegram factors that subject plans
to liability, and they sought t o prospectively regulate medical deci
sions made by MCOs. Rathe r than having plaintiffs ' lawyers sue to
overturn individual denial-of-care decisions, a more efficient system
would provide states with a safe harbor to regulate the impact of
MCO incentives on medical d ecisionmaking. Tha t is, a more effi
cient state regulatory system for MCOs would involve a bright-line
test demarcating ERISA's pre e m p tive shield of prospective utiliza
tion review. If the state regulated within the boundaries of the safe
harbor, ERISA preemption would not be an issue. Not surprisingly,
states increasingly tried to regulate prospective utilization review
under ERISA's saving clause,93 a safe harbor to ERISA preemption.

(finding Pegram inapplicable to a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), al
though it "features aspects of an HMO" ) .
92 . See Rubin-Schneiderman, 1 63 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (suggesting that claims
are not p reempted only because MCO acts as both medical provider and
decisionmaker) .
93. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1 9 74 § 5 1 4(b) (2) (A) , 29
U.S.C. § 1 1 44 (b) (2) (A) ("saving" state laws regulatin g insurance from preemption
by ERISA) .
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The next ERJSA Supreme Court case examined whether such a law
could circumvent ERISA preemption.
Rush Prudential HMO v. Mora n : Regulation fry the

B.

Saving Clause

In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, the Supreme Court ex
amined whether an insurance code regulation could be appl i e d to
an ERISA MC0.94 State insurance code regulations have always oc
cupied a special nic h e under ERJSA. Because insurance is c o nsid
ered to be a traditional state function, the McCarran-Ferguso n Act,
which preempted federal antitrust regulati o n , allowed states to reg
ulate the business of i nsurance (i.e., reserve requirements, aspects
of the business side of insurance, and the identity of those pe rmit
ted to buy and sell policies) . ERJSA also authorizes the states to
regulate the business of insurance,95 through the Act's saving
clause, which "saves " the business of insurance, and its regulation,
from ERISA preemption.96 Under this clause, state insuranc e regu
lations are applicable to all MCOs, regardless of ERJSA status .97
At issue in Rush Prudential HMO was whether an ERISA MCO
had to comply with an Illinois insuranc e c od e regulation that man
dated external review of adverse prospective utilization review deci
sions, if challenged by the patient-beneficiary.98 Justice Souter,
writing for a 5-4 maj ority, began his discussion by observing that a
state regulation having "the effect of [regulating] an integral part
of the policy relati onship between the insurer and the insured" is
saved from ERJSA preemption. In Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
the Court had an n ounced a three fa c tor test for determining
whether a state law regulates the business of insurance.99 Specifi94. 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002) ("The issue in this case is whether the statute, as
applied to health benefits p rovided by a health maintenance organization under
con tract with an employee welfare benefit plan, is preempted by [ERISA] . ) ;
"

see

also Corporate Health Ins. v . Tex. Dep't of Ins., 2 1 5 F.3d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir.

2000) (earlier case permitting non-malpractice forms of state regulation over
MCOs via professional organizations) .

95. 15 u .s.c §§ 1 0 1 1 - 1 0 1 5 (2000).
96. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1 974 § 51 4(b) (2) (A) , 29
U . S.C. § 1 1 44 ( b) ( 2 ) (A) .
97. An importan t limitation of the saving clause, however, is the "deemer
clause ." E RI SA § 5 1 4 (b) ( 2 ) (B) , 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 44 (b ) (2) (B) . The deemer clause
prevent� a self-i nsured ERISA plan from being deemed an insurance company and
.
.
hence subject to state regulauon. A more detailed d iscussion of the deemer clause
follows,

infra

Part I l l .D.

98 V.f 2 1 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1 25/4-10 (2000 ) .
99. 458 U .S. 1 1 9, 1 29 ( 1 982) .
.

•
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of insurance if the

( I ) "has the effect of trans ferring or spreading a policyholder's

risk;"

(2) "is an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured;" and
(3) "is limited to entities within the insurance industry. " 1 00
Subsequently, the Court made it clear that a state law could regu
late the business of insurance without all three Pireno factors being
present. I O I
I n Rush Prudential HMO, Justice Souter found that two of the
three Pireno factors were present. 1 0 2 First, the Illinois statute regu
lated an integral part of the p ol i cy relationship between the insurer
and the insured because the statute addressed how the terms of the
insurance contract were to be in terpreted. Second, because the ex
ternal review statute was only applicable to the insurance industry,
it was limited to entities within the insurance industry. 1 03 Accord
ingly, because two out of the three Pireno factors were present, the
Illin ois statute was considered t o regulate the business of insurance
and was th e refore saved from ERISA preemption . 1 04
The importance of Rush Prudential HMO is tha t the Supreme
Court made it clear that MCO insurance procedures, including pro
spective utilization review, could be regulated under

a

state 's insur

ance code regardless of ERISA s tatus. Although the Court had not
budged on its position that states cannot mandate benefits, Rush

Prudential HMO continued whe re Pegram left off: Pegram granted
the states the authority to retrospectively determine whether an
MCO wrongfully denied care on a case-by-case basis, while Rush Pru

dential HMO extended the states ' authority to prosp e ctively regulate
1 00. Id.
101. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 373 ( 1 999) (consider
ing "as a matter of common sense" whether a rule regulates insurance, and noting
� hat the factors are "relevant" but not "required") . In the wake of the UNUM opin
ion some courts adapted a "common sense" approach to the business of i nsurance,
rather than applying the Pireno factor a nalysis. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Ins. Comm'r, 8 1 0 A.2d 425, 432-33 (Md. 2002 ) . This derogation of the Pireno
factor analysis was later addressed by the Court in Ky. Ass 'n of Health Plans. See
discussion infra Part III.C.
102. 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002) .
103. The nature of the state statute mandating external review of an HMO is
significant. One of the key facts that distinguished Cicio v. Does, 3 2 1 F.3rd 82, 95
< 2d Cir. 2003) , from Rush Prudential HMO was that the New York statute in ques
.
tion
in Cicio was part of the public health code.
104. 536 U.S. at 375-87.
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MCO medical decisionmaking. The key to this authority is that the
state regulatio n must be "specifically directed toward" the insur
ance industry if i t is to be saved from ERISA preemption. w5
Rush Prudential HMO gives the states broad latitude to regulate
prospective benefit decisions by regulating prospect ve utilizat on

�

�

review, pointing to a major problem with state regulation: assuming
that MCOs by their very nature are going to control costs, 106 the
rule in Rush Prudential HMO could be used to allow states to man
date benefits for an ERISA plan-something the Supreme Court
has steadfastly refused to do. Hence, for treatments tha t are not
specifically excluded from the plan, a state can use the third party
review process as a surrogate for a law mandating the benefit. Man
dated benefit laws are often driven by noisy interest groups rather
than medical science; in many cases, they mandate that plans pay
for treatments (such as bone marrow transplants for breast cancer)
which have not been proven to work. In other cases, the mandated
treatment is for a social condition that has been medicalized by
medical imperialism. Thus, Rush Prudential HMO conflicts with the
dicta in Pegram that recognized cost-containment as a legitimate
pursuit of an ERISA medical plan . 1 0 1

C.

Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller:
Business of Insurance

A New Test for the

The third and most recent medical ERISA Supreme Court case
is Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans v. Miller. 1 08 Wh ile both Pegram and
Rush Prudential HMO turn on what can best be termed m ixed eligi
bility-treatment decisions, Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, which fo
cuses on a state' s "any willing provider" (AWP) statute, is the first
Supreme Court case to reach beyond medical decisionmaking to
address factors that limit state regulation of ERISA plans . Specifi
cally, the statute at issue in Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans stipulated:
"A health in �urer shall not discriminate against any provider who is
.
located withm the geographic coverage area of the health benefit
plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for p artici-

1 05. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 50 ( 1 987) .
106. In Rush Prudential HMO, the HMO was willing to pay for Ms.

Moran to
undergo th � standard operation to treat Thoracic Outlet
Syndrom e , but Ms. Mo
ran wanted It to pay for an "unconventional" operation . 536
U.S. at 360. Thus, the
facts of ush
tial HMO are similar to those of Russell. The key distinction is
that savmg state msurance regulations was not an issue
in Russell b ecause state
HMO regulations were still at a rudimentary
stage .
. . W7. Ru.sh Pnu/.ential HMO will also undermi ne efforts to
improve quality of
ca1e by plans that want to base care decision s on
evidence-ba�ed medical research .
1 08. 1 23 S . Ct. 1 471 (2003).

�

Pnul�
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pation established by the health insurer, including the Kentucky
state Medicaid program and Medicaid partnerships . " 1 09 The MCO
industry frowns upon such AWP statutes because they frustrate
MCOs' ability to control the cost and the quality of health care ser
vice, sinc e the statutes require an MCO to contrac t with cost-ineffi
cient and potentially incomp etent providers.

Both the trial and

appellate courts found that Kentucky's AWP statute was related to
the ERISA health plans.

However, following the lead of the Su

preme C ourt in Rush Prudential HMO, the Sixth Circuit ruled that
Kentucky's AWP statute regulated the business of i nsurance and was
therefor e saved from ERISA preemption.110 T h e insurer then
appealed.
Justi c e Scalia began the analysis of a unanimous Court by con
sidering the MCOs' argume n t that the AWP statute could not be
protected from ERISA preemption by the saving clause because
AWP statutes are not "specifically directed toward" the insurance
industry as required by Pilot Life. 1 1 1 The MCOs argued that AWP
statutes were directed at health care providers, and placed in Ken
tucky's insurance code only as a n end-run around ERISA preemp
tion. In support of this position, the MCOs cited Group Life &

Health Insurance v. Royal Drug for the proposition that if agreements
between insurers and third parties can be seen as outside of the
"business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, then
regulation of similar agreements should not be saved from ERISA
pree mption under § 2 (b) of the Act. 1 1 2 The Court rejected this ar
gument a n d found that the AWP statute did n o t impose "any
proh ibitions or requirements o n health-care providers," 1 1 3 and ac
cordingly did not regulate the industry.

Moreover, even when a

state law affects parties outside the insurance industry, it does not
automatically follow that a state law is not specifically directed at the
insuranc e industry: "Regulatio n s 'directed toward' certain entities

1 09. Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.l 7A-270 (Michie 200 1 ) .
1 1 0. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 372 (6th Cir. 2000).
1 1 1 . 1 23 S. Ct. at 1 475.
1 1 2. Id. at 1 476-77; see also Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S.
205, 232 n.40 ( 1 979) (claiming that there would be no "principled basis" for distin
guishing between direct and indirect effects) .
1 1 3. 1 23 S. Ct. at 1475. The Court also noted that Royal Drug did not involve
a state law regulating the agreements in question but the private agreements them
selves, and that it was therefore unhelpful as precedent for purposes of ERISA. Id.
at 1475 -76 ( " E RISA's savings clause, however, is not concerned (as is the McCar
ran-Ferguson Act provision) with how to characterize condurt undertaken by pri
vate actors, but with how to characterize state laws in regard to what thev
' regulate. "') .
·

'
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will almost always disable other entities from doing, with the regu
lated entities, what the regulations forbid; this does not suffic � to
,
place such regulation outside the scope of ERISA s savings
clause . " 1 1 4
Justice Scalia's summary dismissal of the "directed toward" lan
guage argument of the MCO, and the Court's narrow construction
of the saving clause, suggests that the Supreme Court does not want
saving clause litigation to generate a torrent of li �iga�ion i n a man
.
ner analogous to that which followed the expansive m terpretauon
of the preemption clause's "related to" language.
The Court next examined the Pireno factor that it h a d avoided
in Rush Pruden tia l HMO: the "risk pool . " According to the Court,
an "AWP prohibition substantially affects the type of risk pooling
arrangements that insurers may offer," 1 15 implying tha t such stat
utes regulate the business of insurance. However, Justice Scalia ob
served that the Court's prior cases concerning the saving clause
turned "to varying degrees, on our cases interpreting §§ 2 (a) and
2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act," noting that this reliance was
misdirected because it "failed to provide clear guidance to lower
federal courts, and, as this case demonstrates, added little to the
relevant analysis. That is unsurprising, since the statutory language
of � l 1 44 (b) (2) (A) differs substantially from that of the McCarran
Ferguson Act." 1 1 6 Rather than being concerned with h e alth care
and benefits , Justice Scalia opined, the focus of the McCarran-Fe r
guson Act was limited to issues of a ntitrust and litigation conducted
"by private actors, not state laws." 1 1 7 The Court also acknowledged
that its holdings in UNUM and Rush Prudential HMO, both of which
were predicated on McCarran-Ferguson analysis, were problematic
because they did not specify how many Perino factors had to be pre

or the relative weight of the factors. 1 l H Accordingly, Kentucky
Ass n of Health Plans held that it would " make a clean break from
the McCarran-Ferguson factors" for interpretation o f the saving

sen�,

1 1 -1 . Id. at 1 476.
I I :>. Id. at

1 478.

1 1 6. Id.
1 1 7. Id.

l I H._ Id. ( "Our holdings in UNUM a n d Rush Prudential-tha
t a s tate law may
. . the hrs
�·ul
t McCarra.n-Ferguson factor yet still be saved
from
pre-em ptio n un der
, (A)-ra
� l 1_ �4(b) (2)
1se more questions than they

answer and provide wide oppor
.
t�1111t�es for diverg
ent outcom:s. May a state law satisfy any
two of the three McCar1 ·'.11-F�rgl�son fac �ors an? still fall under the savings clause?
Just one? What
l_1 •1P.r_rns . ' ' two of three factors are satisfie d,
but not 'securely satisfie d' or 'clearly
.
s.1t1sht ·d. as
m UNUM and Rush Pnul.e
ntiaP.").

they were
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clause of ERISA. 1 19 The court then announced a new two-prong
test for whether a state law is to be deemed a law that "regulates
insurance": " [£] irst, the state law must be specifically directed to
ward entities engaged in insurance," and second, "the state law
must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the
insurer a n d the insured." 1 20 Because "Kentucky's law satisfies each
of these requirements," it was saved from ERISA p r eemption . 1 2 1
D.

Caveat: The Deemer Clause

ERISA's deemer clause prohibits a state from d eeming that a
self-funded ERISA plan is an insurer subject to s tate regulation
under th e saving clause. 1 22 The ERISA saving clause , which was the
subject of both Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health
Plans, and which allows states to regulate plans, i s limited by the
deemer clause, which says tha t if a plan is purely s elf-funded, then
the savin g clause does not a p p ly. The key to understanding the
deemer clause is remembering that Congress was thinking of pen
sion plans, not health plans, when it wrote ERISA. The deemer
clause says that although a self-funded and administered pension
plan is doing something that looks like what an insurance company
does, this does not make it an insurance company.

For example,

while pensions take special expertise to administer, the expertise
required is the same sort of financial expertise that many corpora
tions use in their core businesses. Indeed, it is n o t unusual for a
company to fund and run its own pension plan. Such a plan invests
its reserves and pays benefits, closely resembling involvement in the
business of insurance. Without the deemer clause, these plans
would be subj ect to state regulation because they d o the same busi
ness as insurance companies.
The d e emer clause is more complicated for health plans be
cause employers cannot run health plans internally in the way that
they can run pension plans. Administration of a health plan re
quires knowledge of medicine and the services of many health care
providers, something that is outside the usual busin ess expertise . 1 2 3
1 1 9. Id. at 1 479.
1 20. Id.
1 2 1 . Id.
1 22. Employee Retirement Income Secu rity Act of 1 974 § 5 1 4 (b) (2) ( B ) , 29
U.S.C. § 1 1 44 ( b ) (2) ( B ) ; spe also, e. g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 ( 1990)
("We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws
that 'reg ula t [ e ] insurance' within the meaning of the saving clause.") .
1 23. Almost all states banned the corporate practice of medicine when ER ISA
was written . These bans generally prevented physicians from being employed by
non-physicians, so that employers that wanted to retain physi cians to provide gen-
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While a health plan may be completely self-funded, it is almost
.
never run exclusively by the employer. Rush Prudential HMO and

Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans involved em loyers whose

p

� l�ns were

run by external companies, called third party adm1mstrators
(TPAs) . The opinions in both decisions contained footnotes refer
ring to the d eemer clause. In

Kentucky Ass 'n

f Health

o

Plans, the

Court stated, "The deemer clause presents no obstacle to Ken
tucky's law, which reaches only tho s e employee benefit plans 'not
exempt from s tate regulation by E RISA . . . . "' 1 2 4 Similarly, the
Court in Rush Prudential HMO stated, "111inois 's Act would not be
'saved' as an i nsurance law to the extent it applied to s e lf-funded
plans . " 1 25 Had the medical plans b e e n pure self-funded or self-ad
ministered plans (like pension plan s ) , these cases would have b een
decided differe n tly: neither plan would be subject to state regula
tion, because the deemer clause would trump the saving clause. To
understand how the Court's decision would be altered if these
plans had bee n self-funded and self-administered, it is useful to con
trast Rush
Pegram.

Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n

f Health Plans with

o

In Pegram, the Court distinguished medical decisionmaking
from decisions regarding plan benefits . Pegram draws a bright line
by holding that individualized medical decisionmaking-making
decisions about an individual' s care that depend on the specific
facts of the individual's medical condition rather than o n a gen eric
reading of the contract of insurance-is completely outside ERISA.
Thus neither the saving clause nor the deemer clause is relevant:
medical decisionmaking is not covered by ERISA, and i t does not
matter how a plan is structured or administered. In c o ntrast, al
though the statutes at issue in Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky
Ass 'n o Health Plans affected how plan administrators make deci

f

s ons that are within the ambit of ERISA, both statutes were permis
sible because the saving clause allows states to regulate plans
involving the business of insurance . 1 2°

�

The difficult question, and one that has not been dire c tly an
swered by co urts or the ERISA statute, is how much of a health
eral care to employees would have had to treat them as independen t contractors.
.
While
a company could employ a physician as medical director to administer a
eal th plan, th � � or orat on would then be exposed to medical malpractic l i abil
e
i;>
ity for the physician s actions and omissio ns.

�

�

1 24. 1 23 S.Ct. at 1 476 n. l .
1 25. 536 U.S. 355, 371 n.6 (2002) .
1 26. The key difference between Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n o
f

is that the latter refines the definitio
n of "business of insuranc e" so as
clear up some of the ambiguities created by UNUM.

HPnith Plam
to
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plan 's operations can be con tracted out before the deemer clause
no longer blocks state regulation. As an example, assume that an
employer sets up a self-insured health plan and runs it directly, per
haps as Kaiser did in the 1 930s. The employer contracts with physi
cians to provide care, sets th e terms of the care, but makes no
medical decisions.

While the self-funded employer is providing

both medical and insurance s e rvices, in a manner analogous to an
HMO, the deemer clause prevents the state from declaring the em
ployer's plan an insurance company subject to s tate regulation.
This is consistent with the purpose of ERISA, which was to create a
special legal niche protecting self-funded health and pension plans.
In c o n trast, while large employers may have enough employees
to justify running a plan in-house, few do it because of the complex
ity (created by the need to have medical expertise and providers) of
running an MCO system. Running a plan entirely in-house also
limits the options for managin g care: if the employer starts making
medical-ne cessity decisions, Pegram will allow the beneficiaries to
sue the employer in its role as plan administrator for medical mal
practice.

No employer wants the po tential legal liability and bad

publicity t h at such state court claims would bring, given that there
are n o rep o rted cases in which a court found that a h e alth plan with
a TPA was governed by the d eemer clause. 1 27
If the e mployer does not give the third party administrator any
medical discretion in the administration of benefits, then the
deemer clause would logically extend to the administrator. Given
the cost of health care claims, however, it would be expected that
the employer would want the administrator to have both the au
thority and the duty to find ways to ensure that the care was pro
vided in a cost effective manner. The more authority the employer
gives the administrator, the less l ikely the deemer clause will apply.
The right to make medical-ne cessity decisions, as was at issue in
Rush Prudential HMO, would be another powerful reason for the
courts to fina that the administrator was outside the deemer clause.
Moreover, because Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans fou n d that an AWP
law affected risk sharing, it could also be argued that an administra
tor who sets up a physician panel rather than letti n g patients seek
care from any physicians they wanted is outside the deemer clause
because i t i s acting as an insurer.
1 2 7.

See, e. g. , Marks

v.

Watters, 322 F.3d 3 1 6, 323, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2003)

< finding that claims against administrative actor making only non-medical deci
.
sions were appropriately removed to fede ral court under ERISA § 502 rather than
through § 5 1 4 analysis) .
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In short, b ecause health plans are distinctly different from pen
sion plans, it is impossible to predict the real impact of t h e deemer
clause in health plan regulation. T h e language about t h e deemer
clause in Rush Prudential HMO, Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, and
other health plan cases is dicta. It is impossible to tell from the case
record wheth e r the court is going to be strict about its standards for

� �lans

applying the deemer clause, or whe ther the nature of healt

causes employers to contract out so much of the plan adm1mstra
tion that the deemer clause is irrel evant.

Clear financial benefits

result when an expert TPA administers a self-insured h e alth plan
lacking comparable i nternal expertis e . M oreover, in h i ri ng a T A,
a self-insured plan would insulate itself from exposure to m edical

�

malpractice claims. The price of the third party administration of
the plan would be that the decisionmaking that is delegated to the
TPA becomes subject to state insurance code regulation. If a court
were to attemp t to extend deemer clause protection to third-party
administrator actions that are dictated by the plan (i.e., to decisions
where the third-party administrato r has no discretion) , the court
will be faced with a line-drawing issue analogous to the "related to"
problem that has plagued ERISA p reemption.

E.

Implications: MCOs Face Increased Exposure

Collectively, Pegram,

Rush Prudential HMO, and Kentucky Ass 'n of

Health Plans increase liability exposure for MCOs when

they engage

in medical decisionmaking. I n the days before Pegram, MCO medi
cal directors routinely second-guessed treating physicians and made
de facto medical decisions under the guise of prospective utilization
review without the MCO acquiring any liability. Given that there
was little downside at that time to denyin g medical care, MCOs op
erated in an environment where strong incentives existed to deny
even necessary medical care. Thus, while horror stories of the con
sequences of under-prescription of medical care occasionally
eak �d into the p ress and written a p pellate opinion, what is surpris
mg 1s that there were not more.

�

however, made it clear that if medical care was wrong
fully demed by p rospective utilization review, and if a medical deci

Pegr�m,

sion was involved , that decision was subject to judicial review. After
when a i:i MCO either intentionally or negligently harmed a
pat1ent, the patlent could sue the m edical director for malpractice.
.
This meant that the MCO accrued liability for medical decisions

Pe�am,

made by its � edical director under respondeat superior theory. Thus,
the first ym e , E SA MCOs needed to contemplate e ither giv
ing up medICal dec1s1onmaking power or purchasing medical mal-

�or

�
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insurance.

Given

the

huge awards

in

cases brough t

successfully against non-ERISA M COs, managing medical decisions
would h ave to be very cost-effective to be worth doing under
Pegra m . Many plans had already begun to question the effectiveness
of prospective utilization review before Pegra m because it is very
costly to do-Pegram just provided one more powerful incentive to
shift to different cost-control s trategies. 1 28 Rush Prudential HMO
and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans further undermined the ability of
MCOs to control care through plan-driven strategies to manage
medical decisionmak.ing, in that they confirm tha t the state may
regulate some aspects of ERISA health plans.
Allowing the states to regulate MCO medical decisionmaking
under th e i r insurance codes a n d their tort laws creates an interest
ing situa tion. Arguably, each state could set its own quality stan
dards, which would thereby defeat an express purpose for enacting
ERISA: to provide national em ployers with a uniform set of laws to
govern

the administration

of employee health

plans.

Wealthy

states, or those with powerful plaintiffs' lawyer lobbies, could set the
quality-of-health-care bar highe r than less-endowed states that can
not afford equally luxurian t medical care. 1�9 Such a crazy quilt of
health c a re regulations would increase the cost of health insurance
in national plans, in addition to defeating this express purpose of
ERISA.

Thus, we soon may see national businesses and labor un

ions lobbying Congress to provide a unified set of h e alth care regu
latio ns as ERISA is underm i n e d by the courts . 1 30
128. A recent Aetna settleme n t agreement is a good example of such alterna
tive cost-c o n trol strategies. Settl.ement Agreement (May 2 1 , 2003 ) , availabl.e at http:/ I
www.aetna.com/Iegal_issues/pdf_documents/settlement.pdf
NYU A n nual Survey of American Law ) .

(on

file

with

the

1 29. To some extent this is already happening. Louisian a , a poor state, has
the nation ' s most draconian tort reform laws, putting very stringent limits on medi
cal malpra c tice awards . Whether this is cause or effect is hard to say, but the qual
ity of care i n many of Louisiana's charity hospitals is very low.
130 . Even before Justice Scalia ' s opinion in Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans was
han ded down, America had become increasingly concerned over the rising cost of
health insurance. See, e. g., David Stires, The Breaking Point, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003,
at 1 04-08. Given the current cost of health insurance, many e mployers can no
longer afford to provide such coverage as a benefit. Conse q u e ntly, between 2001
and 2002, nearly four out of five individuals without health i nsurance were em
ployed or actively looking for employment.

FAMILIES USA,

GotNC WITHOUT

HEALTH I NSURANCE: NEARLY ONE 1N THREE NoN-Et.oERLY AMERICANS 5 (Mar. 2003 ) ,

available a t http://www.familiesusa.org/site/ DocServer/ Goin g_witho ut_repon.
pdf?docl0=273) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law ) . Kentucky
Ass'n of Health Plans will likely aggrava te this situation.
·
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N.

THE FUTURE OF THE HEALTH
INSURANCE INDUSTRY

A.

After Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and
Kentucky Ass' n of Health Plans

Health Insurance

At the time of its introduction, managed care was a logical re
action to rampant medical inflatio n that was driven by the nexus of
fee-for-service medicine and the medical imperialism model of
care. Before the limitations and p erverse consequences of man
aged care dominated the public discourse, there were grave c� n
cerns about the unintended consequences of fee-for-service
medicine: these included unnecessary surgery, unneeded and even
dangerous drug prescriptions, ever more splintered medical care
driven by super-specialization, increasing lengths of h ospital stays
with rising levels of iatrogenic injuries, and most criti c ally, rapidly
rising costs that were seen as unsupportable. Managed care, in its
initial form of closed-panel HMOs with one-stop shopping for med
ical care, theoretically offered better-coordinated care, the elimina
tion of unnecessary and dangerous care, more patient convenience
(achieved by offering more services in the office) , and better qual
ity of care ( th rough modern management) . To a great extent,
these promises were fulfilled, and patients in these e arly HMOs
(such as Kaiser in California) were very satisfied with their care.
As cost control became an issue in the 1970s and 1980s, these
early HMOs, which had not marketed themselves as m oney-saving
entities, shifted their marketing and organization to use their ad
ministrative structures to cut costs. They were soon joined by many
other forms of managed care, all seeking to control costs by con
trolling medical decisionmaking. 1 3 1 Unfortunately, while there was
mo1:ey to be saved by reducing the charges for services, and by re
ducmg unnecessarily expensive services or unneeded services, it is
often difficult to determine what can be cut without harm and what
is a necessary service. Physicians who uncritically ordered unneces
sary tests and procedures under FFS did not have the skills or
clinical information to make good decisions about tests and proce
�ures that could be eliminated under managed care. More troub
lmgly: as the c ourts recognized ERISA preemption of both state tort
law�u 1ts and state regulation dealing with MCO control of medical
.
.
dec1s1onmakmg, ERISA MCOs became more ruthless i n their cost
cutting and less concerned about the quality of care . This was exac1 3 1 . S1'f Richards & McLean,

M< ..Os paralleled

su/Jra note 1 5, at 447 (notin g that the rise of
the generall y "rising cost of health care") .
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erbated by economic factors: many MCOs did not make money and
employed ever more desperate strategies to cut costs. 1 32
In response to this situatio n , patients, plaintiffs ' lawyers, and
state regulators pushed the courts to rethink ERISA preemption.
This push was also supported by physicians, who took the brunt of
the legal fallout from ERISA p reemption. Even into the late 1990s,
while the courts were holding that ERISA plans coul d not be sued
for interfering with medical decisionmaking, treati n g p hysicians en
joyed no preemption and were the sole available targets of plain
tiffs ' ire . 1 33 Thus, while p hysicians were forced to deliver lower
quality c a re or risk losing their jobs or contracts with the insurer,
they could not use the insurer's policies as a defense when they
were sued for medical malpractice. 1 34
Ultimately, the Supreme Court responded to these concerns
with its Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health
Plans decisions. These cases carved out regulation of medical deci
sionmakin g from ERISA preemption (at least, for plans run by
third party insurers not covered by the deemer c l ause ) . 1 35 Plans
that continue to directly control medical decisionmaking are sub
ject to tort lawsuits and to state regulation of their decisions. However, Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans also
undermined the Court's rec o gnition in Pegram that cost control is
not an i llegitimate goal of managed care, and may be necessary if
health care is going to be broadly available. 1 36 One can argue that
Pegram is about malpractice and that plans should not commit mal
practice. 1 37 Even if plans are willing to accept the medical malprac
tice risks, Rush Prudential HMO still imposes state regulatory
controls on ERISA plans. Rush Prudential HMO itself is a good ex1 32. Robert Lowes, We Nailed an HMO jM $6 Million, MED. EcoN., Dec. 23,
2002, at 60, 65-66 (stating that defunct HMOs' losses "weren 't produced by run
away medical costs," but from "adm i n istrative costs") .
1 33 . See Lancaster v. Kaiser Fou n d . Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1 1 37, 1 1 49-50
(E.D. Va. 1 997) (finding that medical malpractice claims again s t physicians-and
vicarious l i ability for insurers-are n o t preempted by ERISA, while direct negli
gen ce claims against insurers are p r e empted) .
1 34. McLean & Richards, supra n o te 22, at 12.
1 35 . The authors believe that because the excesses of managed care drove the

U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider ERISA in Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and
Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, it is u n likely that the Court will then undermine
these cases by allowing the same excesses under plans sheltered by the deemer
clause.

1 36. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 2 1 1 , 2 1 9-22 (2000 ) .
1 37. Anyone familiar with medical malpractice litigation against MCOs will
�ecognize that it is very difficult to defend a proper medical decision to deny care

if a consequence of that decision is to save money.
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ample of the problem: the plan that prompted the litigation ri &"h t
fully, per its written policies, denied payment for an expens1v � ,

dangerous, unconventional, and unproven treatment for a condi
tion that arguably does not require treatment at all.
� fortu� ately,
a state regulation allowed the patient to h ave the dec 1s1on � eVIewcd
,
by a third party reviewer, 1 38 who overturned the plan s demal base
.
on the reviewer's own criteria for treating the pauent's cond1-

1;1

?

tion. 1 3Y The problem with outside review of denial-of-care decisions
is that the reviewer has no incentive to d e ny care 1 40 and every rea

son to approve the treatment,1 4 1 as under the traditional FFS model

of care.
B.

Rethinking the

Tragic

Choices

At the beginning of this article we listed six factors that affect

the cost of health care in the United States:

( 1 ) health care providers offer new services, which appear to
improve outcomes but either cost more than existing trea t
ments or have no existing analog;
(2) demographic s hifts increase the number of elderly persons
needing medical services;
(3) lifestyle and environmental diseases increase the number
of persons needin g medical services;

( 4) health care providers charge more for the same services;
1 38. Certain administrative decisions may still qualify as medical decisions
subj ect to state review.

See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins.,

215

F. 3cl 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000); Murphy v . Bd. of M e d . Examiners, 949 P . 2d 530, 536

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1 997) ; State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41
S.W.3d 474, 476-77 (Mo. 2001 ) .

1 39. The development of objective guidelines for treatment and precise defi
nition of medic al necessity" will go a long way to eliminating Rush-type litigation.
"

SPP gn1mdly Thomas R. McLean, Medical Rationing: The Implicit Result of Leadership
by Example, 36 J. HEALTH L.

325 (2003) (discussing the "medical necessity" stan

dard and reviewing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE: CooRDINAT
IN(; GonRNMENT ROLES IN IM PRO'v1NG H EALTH CARE QUALITY (2002 ) ) .
1 40. Bone m arrow transplants for advanced breast cancer are a good exam
ple . They never had good scientific backing, yet h e alth plans were sued for not
. .
�ml\1dmg_ them and some states passed laws mandating that they be covered. Iron1Cally, while later medical research has shown them to be ineffective, expensive,
_
and very detnmental
to the patient's quality of life , these state mandates are s till in
place.
1-t 1 : The pla is also subject to fraud by it� own physicians, who may manipu
�
la �t patient
'.11 ed1cal information to justify unnecessary treatments. See Matt
0 ( .m�nor. .I ransfJlanl Scandal Hits 3 Hospitals, CHI. TRIB.
July, 29, 2003, at 1
(<h.' sn1h111g how several physicians m ani p u late d diagnose in
order to p erform
s
_
11n1 1Hhcatc
cl liver transpl ant<;) .
'.
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(5) health care p roviders offer n ew sen·ices to gai n market
share or increase profits, which ar·e more costly bu t h ave little
benefi t O\'cr existing services, or offer u n n ecessal )' services; and

(6) m ore

services are put unde r the medical umbrella.
I.

The Pitfalls of Legislative Reforms

We the n asked whether it is possible to sort o u t factors four
and five from factors one and two, so as to avoid Professor Oren
tlicher's tragic choices. We now re turn to this analysis in the light
of the U.S. Supreme Court's restr ucturin g of ERISA's preemp tion
of state req uirements on managed care plans. Contr olling fac tors
four and five a n d distinguishin g them from factors o n e and two
requires that there
decisionmakin g.

be

some

s ystem

for con trolling

medical

Chelati o n therapy for cardiac disease provides a good example
of how these factors play out in the real world. Chelatio n therapy is
being offered b y health care providers i n many communities as a
new and miraculous treatment.

However, not only is documenta

tion of the therapy's efficacy lacking, 14� chelation therapy may be
detrimental if used in place of effe ctive treatments, and it costs the
health care s ystem more than $400,000,000 a year, perhaps much
more.143 While providers of this treatment would call it a factor
one treatmen t-one that is valuable and must be paid for even
though it is cos tly-an MCO would rightly term it a factor five-a
worthless and c ostly treatment. Thus, the question is which classifi
cation would prevail under the n e w rules of Rush Prudential HMO
and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans.
The U. S . S upreme Court's recent ERISA preemption cases
greatly limi t the ability of MCOs to control the care that i s delivered
to their patien ts. 144 While Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n

of Health Plans are ostensibly about the right of the state to regulate
�ealth plans t o ensure the protection of the public, their results will
hkely be paradoxical. Rush Prudential HMO authorizes states to im
pose admin i s trative due process

(e .g. , third-party review of the

MCOs' decisions) on MCOs, but s e ts n o standards for review. Ac
cordingly , MCOs' costs will rise after Rush Prudential HMO because
�he cost of administering an HMO with cost-effective p roviders will
in�re �se. For e xample, it is likely that an independe n t reviewer in
llhno1s would approve chelation therapy-the treatmen t is some142 . M erril L. Knu dtson et. al, Chelation TherafrY for lschemic Heart Disease: A
Ran domized ControUed Trial, 287 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 48 1 , 484 (2002).
1 4 3 . Id. at 48 1 .
144. M cLean & Ric hards, supra note 7, at 39.
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thing that the p a tient wants and that som e physician say� is both a
.
good idea and one that is worth p erformmg (the only d1scernable
requirement for approval in

Rush Prudential HM0) . 145

.

The fundamental problem with state regulation o f MC s is
that such regulation is driven by patient and health care p rovider

�

groups that seek only to deal with the denial-of-care aspects of MCO
decisionmaking. The most common manifestations of this p roblem
are statutory mandates for insurance coverage that are driven by
media storms rather than good science. 1 4 6 The costs o f care are
further ratche te d up when such mandated coverage is sometimes
unnecessary or dangerous. 1 47 Prior to Rush Prudential HMO, such
mandates did not apply to ERISA plans, unless enacted as federal
law. However, after Rush Prudential HMO, states will b e able to by
pass the prohibition against mandated benefits by recasting them as
quality-of-care mandates. This is an example of the "tragedy of the
commons" phenomenon that afflicts most state regulati o n o f pri
vate health care: 1 48 the immediate individual benefit from in
creased care is perceived to outweigh the more global problem of
cost-of-care increases. As mandates are increased, care becomes
more expensive and more people are excluded from coverage.
This is n o t a new problem. In 1974, the federal government
gave states regulatory power over the development of new health
care facilities . 1 49 The centerpiece o f this legislation was the certifi
cate of need ( CON) process, which was intended to lower costs of
health care by p reventing the construction of new health care facili
ties in areas where there was already adequate capaci ty . 1 s o In most
communities, however, the citizen boards overseeing the CON pro1 45. In fact this is exactly what happened in Rush Prudential HMO, but rather
the approval of
a costly surgical p rocedure that the patient wanted, but that had not yet been
demonstrated to be efficacious.
1 46. David A. Hyman , Regulating Managed Care: Whats Wrong With a Patient Bill
of Right5, 73 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 221, 222-24 (2000 ) .
1 47. Laws limiting insurance companies' ability to deny questionable care
n�ay also be used i � insurance fraud schemes that depend on claims being paid
.
w1Lh little or no review. See Vanessa Furhmans, FBI Raids Surgery Clinics in Probe
f11t1Pst1gators Say Patients Were Paid to Have Surgery in a $300 Million Scam, WALL ST. j.,
Mar. 19, 2004, at A7.
1 48. See generally Garrett Hardin The Tracr
'
bedy oif the Commons 162 Sci 1 243
( 1 968).
1 49. National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1 974, Pub.
L.. No. 93-64 1 , 88 Stat. 2225 ( 1976) .
1 50. See Patrick jo� n McGinley, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering Certifi
,
.
Wlf
of 1\m/
Laws In a ,Managed Competition " System , 23 Fl.A. ST. U L REv 1 4 1
1 48-50 ( 1 995) .

than approvi�g chelation therapy, Rush Prudential HMO concerned

'

•

.

.

.

'
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cess did not limit construction, because they saw the value of a new
facility in their comm unity as ou tweighing its effect on the global
cost of h ealth care .
2.

The l nsti l l l ll' of Medic i ne and National Standards

The o n ly s u pportable antidote to th ese problematic state or
federal insurance mandates is a national set of evidence-based
medicine stan d ards.

For the past several years, the I nsti tute of

Medicine ( I O M ) has been publis h ing reports on medical errors.
These reports paint a grim picture o f n eedless patient suffering and
death. v\Th i l e these reports have b e e n controversial and may dra
matically overstate the consequences of medical mistakes, 1 5 1 they
do identify a key problem in medic ine-the lack of good i nforma
tion on what a re the best treatm e n t options for commo n medical
conditions. T h ere are now maj o r research programs i n place to
develop stan dard protocols for t h e treatment of com m on medical
conditions. While the rationale b e h ind such protocols is i m proving
care, it is ass u m ed that reducing costs is also a main o bj ective. Such
protocols are a l ready available for asthma and are proven to greatly
improve pati e n t care and cut costs by reducing severe complica
tions which require hospitalization. 1 52 Applied to our chelation
therapy example, it is clear that evidence-based clinical-care guide
lines would i m p rove care and save m o n ey.
The IOM envisions that these p rotocols will replace managed
care with a system of risk managed care. 1 53 The key features of risk
managed care will be increased :

( 1 ) utilization of guideline-driven

protocols; ( 2 ) m o n i toring of providers' practices; and (3) financial
mcentives to i nduce provider comp liance with the guideline proto
�ols. 1 54 As e nvisioned by the IOM, risk managed care will be an
u� provemen t over managed care because medical decisionmaking
will be above b o ard and subject to increased scrutiny a n d scientific
validation. T h is would make i t m u c h easier to manage factors four
and five and t o tell when a purportedly beneficial new treatment is
1 5 1 . See Troyen A . Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors
Could It Do Harm?, 342 NEW ENc. J. Mrn. 1 1 23 (2000) ; Clement]. McDonald et. al,
Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggerated in Institute of Medicine Report, 284 ]. AM.

ME.o.

A<>s'N 93-9 4 (2000) .
1 52. McLe an, supra note 139, at 329 , 355 n . 40 (discussing the time-line for
.
im pleme n tation of guideline-driven medicine to treat conditions such as asthma) .
1 53. Implications, supra note 8, at 229.
1 54. See McLean, supra note 139, at 327. See also INST. OF MED., To ERR 1s
H UMAN: BUILD ING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1 - 1 5 (Linda T. Koh n et al., eds.
2000) (sta ting that the current health care system has failed consumers and sug
ges ti n g broad routes to improvement) .
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really yet another unproven treatment tha t will raise costs wit?out
improving care. However, the IOM' s system of health ca� e d e livery
shares, in common with managed care, the fault that lt o �ly ad

dresses the delivery of medical care, n o t the primary preven tion of
illness.155 Because IOM's system does n o t tackle the other causes of
medical inflation, it will have only a limited effect as a cost c on trol
device, 1:;r. although it may be effective a t improving quality of care
and reducing malpractice litigation again s t doctors who follow the
protocols.
3.

Prevention

Factor three-lifestyle decisions tha t increase illness-is the
most important factor to manage. Lifestyle , perhaps more than any
other factor, is subj e c t to manipulation. Changing lifestyles a n d en
vironmental factors to prevent the development of disease is called
primary prevention. It is the most cost-effective way to m anage dis
eases and also creates the greatest gains for individuals because it is
always better to avoid developing an illness than to receive good
treatment for it. 157 Smoking is the most important p reven tabl e
cause of premature death and chronic illness, and it is on the de
cline because of decades of efforts to make it more difficult for p e o
ple to smoke. Eliminating cigarette machines, making it difficult to
smoke at work, raising the cost of cigar e ttes, and other strategies
are gradually convincing people that smoking is not worth the
trouble. Over the next several decades, it is hoped that smoking
will decrease to levels that will not greatly impact health care.
Obesity is the number two preven table health risk.

Obesity,

which increases the risk from smoking and genetic predispositions
1 55. The IOM's publications make it clear that it is aware of the entire

breadth of medical imperialism. We also recog nize that the IOM's techniques
could be used to address medical imperialism issues that are beyond the c o n trol of
health ca �e provi ers. Still, to date, it seems that the government and the business
commumues are interested only in IOM's recommendations to control provider

�

autonomy. Whe ther the payors of health care ado p t effective preventive medicine
.
t�chnology:--wh1ch leverages current assets against only potential future liabil i
ues-remams to be seen .
1 56: However, if the I O M does implement a n effective preventive medicine
system , n. wo ul d b a substantial improveme nt over managed
�
care. Moreover , to
.
�h� IOM s credit,
1 t has a o� g but underappr eciated track record of publishing
.
a1 ucl � s_ on prevenuve med1cme . See INST. OF MED., PU
BLICATION LIST, at h ttp://
www. 10m.edu/ file.asp?i d==7458 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004)
(on file with t h e NYU
Annua l Sur.·ey of Ameri can Law) .

�

1_57. Die� , exerci e , and eliminating smoking could dramatic
�
ally reduce diabe�,u1 e1.' kidney disease, and other chronic conditi ons
that require the most
_
t xpt nsl\ e and least succe ssful
treatm ents .
•

.

t� s .

�
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to heart disease and diabetes, is r i s i n � rapidly i n this c o u n try, with

20.9% of the populati on classified as cl i n ica lly obese, a d ramatic
i ncrease from over thirty years ago . 1 ,-,8 Obesity and i t-; m�jo r secon
dary c o m p l i ca t i o n , type II diabete s , a l ready accoun t fo r s i g nificant
health care expendi tur es , and th e s e c osts will increase d ramatically
as current tre n d s develop th rough time.
Shifting the medical care system toward preve n tive medicine is
a key part of an overall strategy to c o n trol factors such as smoking,
obesity , 1 "'!1 AID S , gun violence, 1 no and accidents, 1 0 1 a l l o f which in
crease health care costs. The medical rol e in prevention is called
secondary p reve n t i o n . The best examp les are h ype rt e n s i o n treat
ment and the c a reful managemen t of d i abetes. Treati n g th ese dis
eases, which o fte n occur together, reduces the development of
heart and k i d n ey disease, blindness, nerve damage leading to am1 58. The core cause of obesity is too much food relative to the individual's
physical activity. There are many i�dividual genetic and metabolic factors that af
fect the exact need for calories and exercise, but at the societal level, the problem
is too much food and too little exercise. This is the result of two trends. First, over
the past fifty years, the U nited States and most other developed countries have
established farm policies that encourage the production of large amounts of cheap
food. These policies have been wildly successful, making food cheap in historical
terms and so abundant that it is difficult to dispose of the excess production. Gov
ern ment policy e ncouraged the consumption of more food, and individuals and
private businesses responded with larger portion sizes and more calorically dense
foods.
During the sam e period, employme n t and household tasks h ave become
much less physically demanding, and changes in living and transportation patterns
resulted in most people getting much less exercise in their daily lives. Schools
all?wed children less time for play, and the shift to organized sports left out the
children who d i d not have the family resources and transportation to participate in
structure d activities outside school time. Passive en tertainment such as television
an d comp uter games became a substitute for active outside play for most children
an d youn g adults.
1 5 9. Medical care providers have an important role in reducing smoking and
obesity and managing diabetes to reduce long term complications and medical
costs. Yet these are activities that pay off only in the long term, and health insur
ance is rated and paid for on yearly cycles. Thus there is no incentive for a health
p�an to encourage preventive care because i t cannot recapture the ultimate savings
Within its financial planning horizon.
1 60. See generally Edward P. Richards, Book Review, 21 J . PoL'Y ANALYSIS &
Mcr.n. 1 66 (2002) (considering various p roposals to prevent the costly effects of
gun violence) (reviewing PHILIP J. CooK &JENS Luowic, GuN V10LENCE-THE REAL

CosTs (2000) ) .
1 6 1 . AIDS, gun violence, and serious accidents, especially automobile acci
dents, are a tremendous burden on urban emergency rooms and hospitals, per
haps the most fragile component in the health care system.
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putation, and other tra c and expensive complications. 1 1;2 These
.
treatments are not expensive, but pose one of the most difficult

gi

problems in the U.S. health care system: ensuring that patients have
consistent access to quality medical care.
Chronic disease treatment is very difficult if patients cannot see
the same physicians over time, and if those physici�ns o not use
standardized care plans to ensure that the chrome diseases are
treated in the most effective manner p ossible. 1 6� As em pl oyers

?

change health plans, as health plans shift patients between different
physicians based on the latest bids for services, as those sam e often
over-worked physicians rush their schedules, it become s dif cult fo r
.
most patients to see their physicians on a regular basis, and impossi

�

ble for diabetic patients with probl e ms that need immediate care to
get that care before the problems become more serious. Preven
tion is very sensitive to inconvenience and delay because patients
ripe for preventive care usually do not have severe enough symp
toms to drive them to get care despite these barriers. Unfortu
nately, although it is hard to get patients to worry about
asymptomatic diseases such as early diabetes or hypertension, get
ting them consistently treated in the early stage of disease is the key
to prevention . 1 64 Many health plans are further complicating this
goal by shifting more of the cost of care to the insured through
higher co-payments and up front charges when they want to see
-

their doctors.

These shifts are intended to make patients better

shoppers for h e alth care, but they really encourage patients to not
go to the doctor unless they are really sick. Unfortunately, this is
the worst possible strategy for preventing the complications of
chronic diseases. When such plans include preventive medicine
c ov� rage, such coverage relates to patients getting a check-up, not
.
.
having their diabetes or hypertension managed.
Since preventive medicine and i njury prevention require pre
sent-da� expenditures that only save money in the longer term,
health msurance must be restructured to have a longer financial

�

1 62. · ee The CDC Diabetes Cost-effectiveness Group, Cost-effectiveness of Jnten
Glyc;mzc Control, Intensified Hypertension Control, and Serum Cholesterol Level Reduc
tion Jo� Type 2. Diabetes, 287 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2542, 2547 (2002)
.
.

swe

1 63. Chnstopher D. Saudek, Progress and Promise of Diabetes Research, 287 J. Ai"1.
(concluding that the "US health care system is unde
niably built around acute, episodic illness, providing a care model that does not
.
deal well Wlth
chronic disease ") .
1 64. CDC Diabetes Cost-Effectiven ess Study Group, The Cost-effectiveness of
.
.�mm mg fa; ,Type 2 Diabetes, 2 0 J. AM. MEO. Ass'N 1 757,
I 757 ( 1 998) (suggesting
�
.
th.it screen ing, ev n while
subjects are asymptom atic, could prove helpful i n terms
�
.
ot disease
prevent ion and would most likely be cost-effective) .

�F.D. Ass, � 2582, 2583 (2002)
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time horizon . 1 65 As with all statistics-based insurance strategies, this
first demands that the risk pools be as large as possible. Addition
ally, insurers and employers should be given incentives to use stan
dard policies that group toge th e r as many patients as possible. 166
While the health care insuran c e industry is already dominated by
large corporations, they write thousands of separate plans, thus
fragmenting the risk pools.

The more difficult problem is that

plans, or the employers who buy them, need to h ave an incentive to
aggressively promote preven tive medical services. This means that
rate decisions need to be made on large pools over a multi-year
time horizon.

From a health p o licy perspective, h ealth insurance

should b e written on multi-yea r contracts with limi ts o n rate in
creases. Thi s has been unpopular because it implies also that the
insureds would have to be locked into a single plan. However, if
the pools of insureds were large enough and spann e d enough em
ployers , and if all plans faced the same requirements, then there
would be little incentive to switch plans.
4.

Muting the Demographics of Aging

The most important factor increasing health care costs is the
relentless push of demographi c s . As the population increases,
which it is slated to do for many years to come, the total cost of
health care increases. As the n umber of elderly persons increases
as a percentage of the population, the cost of health care per capita
again increases. As the numbe r of unhealthy p e rsons, either
through life style choices or now-survivable genetic diseases, in
creases, the cost of care increases further still. Like lifestyle
changes, a b urgeoning aged and ill population increases medical
cost in a way that cannot be controlled by the IOM' s guidelines.
For exam ple, using guidelines, surgical intervention for coronary
artery disease can be limited to individuals with three-vessel disease.
But, because the incidence of coronary artery disease i n c reases with
age, we will soon be paying for m ore coronary interve n ti o n regard-

1 65. See Thomas R. McLean, Medicine v. Health Insurance: A Tale of Two Indus
tries 24 (forthcom ing 2004) (manuscript, on file with the NYU Annual Survey of

Am e ric an Law) .

1 66. The IOM chides the practice of medicine for being variable, overly com
ple x and need lessly inefficient. The truth is that all of these terms apply to the
'.
medical insurance industry. See id. at 4 (" (O] ur health insurance system is also a
co mplex and ineffi
cien t system" ) .
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less.167 Finally, as medical science develops m�re tre � tn� en ts for
previously poorly treatable conditions, the cost of care will 1 � crease.
The increase of elderly in the population is ove rloadmg the
Medicare sys tem, a problem that, while hardly new, will o nly get
.
worse as the baby boom population ages. When people r e u re , the
.
cost of their care shifts to the fede ral government at the same ume
that most of them stop paying taxes.

The burden of paying for

their care, as well as for their social security payments, shifts to the
remaining working population. Wh e n sixty-five was adopted as � he
retirement age, approximately thr e e percent of the population
reached sixty-five. Now, life expectancy is more than seven ty-seven
years, and a significant number of persons are survivin g well be
yond that age.

While current literature shows that most of these

older people are healthier than the i r counterparts in p revious gen
erations, they are still not as healthy on average as younger p e rsons,
and will dramatically raise the cost of care over a comparable num
ber of pers o ns in middle age. This means that the real h ealth care
economics problem is retirement, n o t age.
Shifting the retirement age to seventy would have a profound
effect on the finances of the social s ecurity system and the Medicare
system, as well as increasing state and federal

tax

revenues. While

this would n o t reduce health care costs, it would make many more
of them pay-as-you-go, and take the burden off other w orkers and
the government. This would free u p state and federal money which
could be used to broaden access to care for those who are une m
ployed or working in jobs without h e alth insurance . Increasing the
retirement age to seventy would b e perhaps the most intelle ctually
ho �est and straightforward solution to controllin g Medicare and
.
Social Security expenditures , which would raise the GNP a n d defray
rising health care costs.
C.

Conclusions

Ultimately, society must confront the question of how much it
sp �nds on health care. While econom ists worry about health care
emg too large a part of the GNP , this fear is based on old-fash
one�
notions of an industrial econom y dominated by manufactur�
.
ing I tiH Health care is a very d 1verse
service industry based on

?

·

·

·

1 67. Other countries take a more direct approach
to controllin g health care
a nd do not pay for coronary
interve ntion over a certain age. See McLean,
.111/mz note 1 39 , at 343, 361 n . 1 30.

cost

.
1 68. This stateme nt is made with the assump
tion that health care is not pai d
tor hy employers. If employers pay for
h e alth care and then add it to the cost of
�oods sold, a nation 's economy is disadv
antaged in the global marke t place as
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knowledge, h i gh tec h nology, and p e rso n al services. I t is also a very
local indusll)'·

Health care jo bs, u n l ike manufacturing j obs and

even software e n g i n e e ringj obs, are i n no dan ger of being exported
to foreign cotm t ries. l l i\I T he problem wi th health care spending is
not that it is too large a part of th e GNP, but that it is paid for in
ways that disto r t the job market a n d make it unavailable for many
persons in s o c i e ty.

Many Americans are horrified by European tax

rates, yet whe n all the costs of privately paid-for benefits such as
health care are a d d e d to the tax b i l l , middle class tax payers proba
bly pay as m u c h or more than their E u ropean counterparts, and get
l ess for it. 1 70 As we disc ussed earli e r i n this paper, a key reason why
h ealth care is m ore expensive in the United States is that i t i nc ludes
many direct a n d indirect social welfare costs that would either be
re duced in Europe o r paid under a different umbrella. T h e re is no

health care will make up a larger portion of its spending. Thomas R. McLean,
Cybersurge1y: Innovation nr a Merms to Close Commun ity Hospitals and D isplace Physi
cia ns, 20J. MARSHALL]. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 495, 5 1 1 (2002) ("Simply put, health
care benefits . . . act like a tax on U.S. products and seivices thereby making these
products and services less desirable in the global market place. " ) [ h e reinafter
Cybersurgel): Innovation ] ; Tom McLean, Deep Pockets: The Liability of Risk Managed
Care O!ganizations for Medical Mal/mtctice, in M ED I CAL MALPRACTICE UPDATE 231
(Aspen Law & Business 2003 ) ; Thomas R. McLean, Stealth v. Health: The Compl.exity
0! Tort &form, 1 2 LEGAL MED. PERSP. ( Ma r.-Apr. 2003) , availabl.e a t http://
WWW aclm.org/ pu blications/lmpvol. 1 2_4supplement.asp (discussing need to cut
:
medical spending in order to "make American business more competi tive in the
global market plac e " ) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law ) .
169. A s telemedicine and cybersurgery improve, this statement may n o t be
t� e in five to ten years. See CybersurgeJY: Innovation, supra note 1 68, at 5 1 4- 1 5
(discussing the economic arguments for "out.sourcingn surgery to foreign doctors);
Thoma� R . McLean, Cybersurgel): An A rgument for Enterprise Liability, 23 J. LEGAL
MEn . 167 , 1 68 (2002) (" [I]n the not too distant future, physicians wil l use ad
vanced teleme dicine technology in heretofore unintended ways to p erform cyber
surgery, that is,
physicians will use telemedicine and computer-assisted robotics to
perform su gery
on remote patients. n ) .
r
1 �O. An important subject that is beyon d the scope of this article is i nsurance
.
ad mi nis trative
costs. Europeans have cheaper health care because a single payor
syste m is much
more efficient than the polymorphic health insurance system of
Americ a. It has
been estimated that America could cut its health care costs by
approxi mate ly fifty
percent if America adopted a single payor national health in
surance system. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying For National
Health Insurance-And Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF. , July-Aug. 2002, at 94; see also
McLean, supra note 1 65 , at 16-18 (suggesting that, even if Woolhandler and Him
melstein's fifty percent projected reduction is unrealistic, "consolidation of the
U.S. health insurance market down to a single payor system . . . offers some distinct
advan tages for
the United States") .
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free lunch, and if the United State s does not address its social wel
fare problems directly, it is not surprising that associated costs ulti
mately surface in the only program that the United States does
support: medical care.

